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Intrusion detection is the practice of examining information from computers and
networks to identify cyberattacks. It is an important topic in practice, since the frequency
and consequences of cyberattacks continues to increase and affect organizations. It is
important for research, since many problems exist for intrusion detection systems.
Intrusion detection systems monitor large volumes of data and frequently generate false
positives. This results in additional effort for security analysts to review and interpret
alerts. After long hours spent reviewing alerts, security analysts become fatigued and
make bad decisions. There is currently no approach to intrusion detection that reduces the
workload of human analysts by providing a probabilistic prediction that a computer is
experiencing a cyberattack.
This research addressed this problem by estimating the probability that a computer
system was being attacked, rather than alerting on individual events. This research
combined concepts from cyber situation awareness by applying clustering ensembles,
probability analysis, and active learning. The unique contribution of this research is that it
provides a higher level of meaning for intrusion alerts than traditional approaches.
Three experiments were conducted in the course of this research to demonstrate the
feasibility of these concepts. The first experiment evaluated cluster generation
approaches that provided multiple perspectives of network events using unsupervised
machine learning. The second experiment developed and evaluated a method for
detecting anomalies from the clustering results. This experiment also determined the
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Finally, the third experiment
integrated active learning into the anomaly detection results and evaluated its
effectiveness in improving the accuracy.
This research demonstrated that clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis were
effective for identifying normal events. Abnormal events remained uncertain and were
assigned a belief. By aggregating the belief to find the probability that a computer system
was under attack, the resulting probability was highly accurate for the source IP addresses
and reasonably accurate for the destination IP addresses. Active learning, which
simulated feedback from a human analyst, eliminated the residual error for the
destination IP addresses with a low number of events that required labeling.

Acknowledgements

To the giants of research on whose shoulders I stood to see a little farther, it has been a
privilege to build upon the foundation you have laid.
To Dr. James Cannady, my sincerest gratitude for allowing me to build upon your work
in intrusion detection and for your willingness to serve as my dissertation committee
chair.
To my dissertation committee, who provided constructive criticism throughout the
process, thank you for your patience and for your feedback. You have helped to improve
my research skills.
To Allison, my loving and supportive wife, thank you for sacrificing our time together for
late study nights and for trips to Florida. I could not have accomplished this without your
encouragement and understanding.
To my children, who themselves have grown and accomplished so much since I started
this pursuit, thank you for encouraging me along the way. Remember to continue to
learn, regardless of your age.

Table of Contents

Abstract ii
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
Chapters
1.

Introduction 1
Background 1
Problem Statement 2
Dissertation Goal 2
Discussion 3
Relevance and Significance 6
Barriers and Issues 7
Definition of Terms 9
List of Acronyms 12
Summary 13

2.

Review of the Literature 15
Overview of Reviewed Topics 15
Cyber Situation Awareness 16
Intrusion Detection 22
Probabilistic Intrusion Detection 31
Clustering Ensembles 36
Intrusion Detection Datasets 52
Summary 58

3.

Methodology 59
Introduction 59
Solution Design 60
Experiment 1: Cluster Generation 65
Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection 68
Experiment 3: Active Learning 71
Resource Requirements 72
Summary 73

4.

Results 75
Introduction 75
Experiment Design and Implementation 76
Input Dataset Analysis and Preparation 79
Experiment 1: Cluster Generation 82
Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection 88

v

Experiment 3: Active Learning 97
Summary 101
5.

Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 103
Conclusions 103
Implications 105
Recommendations 106
Summary 108

References 147

Appendices
A.
B.
C.
D.

Source Code Availability and Usage 115
Dataset Descriptions 119
Python Package Versions 125
Detailed Anomaly Detection Results 126

List of Tables

Tables
1.

Summary of Cyber Situation Awareness Literature 19

2.

Summary of Machine Learning Approaches to Intrusion Detection 23

3.

Summary of Co-Occurrence Cluster Evaluation Approaches 45

4.

Summary of Median Partition Clustering Evaluation Approaches 49

5.

Summary of Intrusion Detection Dataset Research 55

6.

Original and Derived NSL-KDD Dataset Label Distributions 80

7.

UNSW-NB15_1 Dataset Label Distributions 82

8.

Distribution of Attack and Normal Records in Sample Partition 85

9.

Prediction of P(A) by srcip and dstip 94

10.

P(A) Accuracy for Ten Runs 96

11.

NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes 120

12.

UNSW-NB15 Attributes and Datatypes 122

13.

Python Package Versions 125

14.

Experiment 2, Run 1 Results 127

15.

Experiment 2, Run 2 Results 129

16.

Experiment 2, Run 3 Results 131

17.

Experiment 2, Run 4 Results 133

18.

Experiment 2, Run 5 Results 135

19.

Experiment 2, Run 6 Results 137

20.

Experiment 2, Run 7 Results 139

vii

21.

Experiment 2, Run 8 Results 141

22.

Experiment 2, Run 9 Results 143

23.

Experiment 2, Run 10 Results 145

List of Figures

Figures
1.

Multiple ways to cluster a deck of cards 4

2.

Clustering ensemble overview 5

3.

Confusion matrix for binary classification 29

4.

Overview clustering ensembles with formal notation 39

5.

High level solution design 60

6.

Algorithm for cluster generation 67

7.

Algorithm for probabilistic anomaly detection 69

8.

Class diagram 76

9.

Graph of votes for NSL-KDD dataset 89

10.

Graph of votes for UNSW-NB15 dataset 90

11.

Pseudocode for active learning algorithm 98

12.

Accuracy of active learning compared to sample size 100

ix

1

Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Intrusion detection systems identify cyberattacks. Malicious or criminal
cyberattacks take an average of 229 days to detect, and the length of time to detect and
contain an attack increases the cost of response (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Consequently,
detecting cyberattacks quickly is vital for organizations. Because of the volume of
intrusion alerts, cyberattacks are sometimes miscategorized in the large number of alerts
that require human analyst review (Julisch, 2003). After long hours of review, analysts
make mistakes, and alerts may be miscategorized (Sawyer et al., 2014). Further, human
analysts make inaccurate decisions and use preconceived biases when dealing with
probabilistic reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Most intrusion detection research
has focused on identifying individual events and has not provided meaning in the broader
perspective of cyber situation awareness (CSA) (Sommer & Paxson, 2003; Erbacher,
Frincke, Wong, Moody, & Fink, 2010; Sommer & Paxson, 2010; Tadda & Salerno,
2010). Detecting intrusions at the individual event level is prone to high false positive
rates and overfitting (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). Thus, new approaches to intrusion
detection are needed to provide better support for human decision-making under
uncertain conditions.
This research developed a system for anomaly-based intrusion detection. The
system incorporated multiple views of anomalies to find the probability that a computer
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system was under attack or had been compromised. The novelty of this research was the
application of clustering ensembles, probability analysis, and active learning to extend
research in intrusion detection. This research also incorporated relevant concepts from
CSA to add meaning to intrusion alerts.

Problem Statement
There is currently no approach to intrusion detection that reduces the workload of
human analysts by providing a probabilistic prediction that a computer is experiencing a
cyberattack. Intrusion detection systems monitor increasingly large datasets that represent
interconnected devices and sensors (Saeed, Ahmadinia, Javed, & Larijani, 2016; AlHamadi & Chen, 2015; Ali & Al-Shaer, 2015). The alerts generated by intrusion
detection systems require human review to evaluate the accuracy of the alerts and to
determine an appropriate course of action (Julisch, 2003). A significant problem is that
intrusion alerts often have high false-positive rates, since intrusions are rare in large
datasets (Kruegel, Mutz, Robertson, & Valeur, 2003; Scott, 2004). Thus, security analysts
become fatigued and make poor decisions after spending hours reviewing alerts (Sawyer
et al., 2014). Improvements in intrusion detection systems are needed to reduce falsepositives, improve the context of alerts, and reduce the burden on human analysts.

Dissertation Goal
The goal of this research was to improve anomaly-based intrusion detection by
adding meaning to alerts through the use of probabilistic clustering ensembles. Adding
meaning to alerts shifts the focus from the individual event level to the computer system
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level. This research developed a method to reduce the workload of security analysts by
focusing on the computer systems most likely experiencing attacks. The results of this
research will allow security analysts to better prioritize their monitoring activity, which
has been found to be important in practice (McElwee, Heaton, Fraley, & Cannady, 2017).

Discussion
An important objective of this research was to apply clustering ensembles to
intrusion detection. There is not one correct way to cluster network information to
identify anomalies. Instead, there are multiple perspectives that, when taken together,
improve accuracy. This idea is supported from prior research, which acknowledges that
“clustering is in the eye of the beholder” (Estivill-Castro, 2002, p. 65). To illustrate this
idea, consider that a reasonable person is given a deck of playing cards, with 52 cards of
four suits, and two joker cards. The person is given direction to cluster the cards into
meaningful groups. There are a wide variety of ways that the person might cluster the
cards. The person might cluster the cards using an obvious feature, such as the face value,
by grouping together all the aces in one group, the twos in another group, the threes in
another group, and so on. Such a grouping results in 13 clusters of four cards each and a
cluster with two jokers. The person might opt for four clusters, where each cluster is
identified by the suit of the card, specifically diamonds, hearts, clubs, and spades. This
grouping results in four clusters with 13 cards in each. In this case, the jokers do not
cluster well, but may be considered anomalies. The person might group the cards using a
feature derived from outside information, such as grouping the cards needed to assemble
a deck for a special game. Such a group might consist of the nines, tens, jacks, queens,
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kings, and aces for playing the game of pinochle. The second group is those not needed to
play that game. Figure 1 illustrates this example using two sample clusterings.

Figure 1. Multiple ways to cluster a deck of cards

From the playing card example above, it is obvious that there is not one correct
way to cluster the cards. Each clustering result has different meaning for different
reasons. A wide variety of clustering results is possible based on the features chosen to
create the groups. Even the anomalies, as represented in 𝑃2 by the jokers, are only
anomalies because of the meaning the person placed on the clustering. Thus, in some
clustering approaches, the jokers cluster well, but in others they appear to be anomalies.
This research used clustering ensembles, which use many different clusterings of
the data to create a clustering solution that works best (Strehl & Gosh, 2002; Fred & Jain,
2005). Figure 2 illustrates the general approach to clustering ensembles. The first stage
generates a diverse set of clustering solutions, ℙ, from among all possible clustering
solutions, ℙ𝑋 . The second stage evaluates the results to arrive at a final clustering
solution, 𝑃 ∗ .
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Figure 2. Clustering ensemble overview

This research used clustering ensembles because of their potential to be useful for
intrusion detection, since they enable unsupervised machine learning using multiple
sources of information, including domain knowledge, in the final clustering solution
(Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). Ensemble approaches to machine learning have proven to be
successful in resisting adversarial evasion (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang, Wang, Zheng,
& Zhao, 2014). Evasion is a tactic to conduct cyberattacks without being detected. There
have been few applications of clustering ensembles to intrusion detection (Weng, Jiang,
Shi, & Wu, 2007; Gao, Zhu, & Wang, 2010). Other related studies have shown that
clustering ensembles have the potential to be effective when applied to intrusion
detection. Lazarevic and Kumar (2005) used an approach similar to clustering ensembles,
called feature bagging, and found it to be successful for intrusion detection. Hou, Chen,
Tas, Demihovskiy, and Ye (2015) found that clustering ensembles were better for the
detection of malware than single base clustering algorithms.
The importance of adding meaning to alerts is established in prior research.
Sommer and Paxson (2003) found that adding context to intrusion detection improved
signature-based methods by detecting multi-step attacks. Machine learning algorithms for
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intrusion detection can find what is abnormal, but generate false positives, because they
lack meaning (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). As a result, security analysts must evaluate
binary indications of cyberattacks with insufficient meaning to make appropriate
decisions. Thus, this research created a semantic level that better represents how human
analysts evaluate security alerts.
Computer network intrusions are generally a multi-step process that requires an
attacker and a victim. (Zhou, Leckie, & Karunasekera, 2010). Understanding the meaning
and significance of network events requires an understanding of the coordination of
events (Zhou et al., 2010). The connection of these events is often uncertain and requires
probabilistic reasoning. Thus, this research used probability analysis to evaluate if a
computer system was being attacked.

Relevance and Significance
Intrusion detection is an important topic in research as well as in practice, and
identifying cyberattacks quickly is important for reducing response costs (Ponemon
Institute, 2016). Unfortunately, intrusion alerts are sometimes missed because of the
volume that must be reviewed (Julisch, 2003). After long hours of reviewing security
alerts, human analysts make poor decisions, and alerts may be miscategorized (Sawyer et
al., 2014). Humans tend to make inaccurate decisions and use preconceived biases when
dealing with probabilistic reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition,
adversarial tactics and evasion require new approaches for the identification of malicious
activity (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). As a result, improving intrusion
detection is a relevant topic for continued research to provide better support for decision-
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making under uncertain conditions. Given the importance of intrusion detection and the
limitations of human judgement, this research provides context for analysts, so they can
make better decisions. The results of this research may be used to augment security
analyst capabilities for responding to intrusion alerts.

Barriers and Issues
This research addressed several barriers and issues that are present in anomalybased intrusion detection research. First, anomaly-based intrusion detection is prone to
high false-positive rates. This is largely due to the imbalanced nature of intrusion
detection data, since there are large amounts of data, but only a few intrusion events
(Scott, 2004). The base rate fallacy stipulates that when events of interest are rare, even
highly accurate detection systems may have a high false positive rate (Kruegel et al.,
2003). This research addressed this issue by focusing on the probability that a computer
system was being attacked rather than on determining the accurate classification of
individual events (Li, Ou, & Rajagopalan, 2010; Tadda & Salerno, 2010).
A second issue in intrusion detection research is overfitting. To achieve higher
accuracy, researchers may over-train learning algorithms or use too much training data to
be generalizable for novel anomalies. This is because machine learning algorithms are
more suitable for detecting similarities than for detecting anomalies (Sommer & Paxson,
2010). Overfitting may also result from the selection of a dataset that contains too many
duplicate records, such as the popular KDD Cup 1999 dataset (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, &
Ghorbani, 2009). Since ensemble approaches to machine learning are less susceptible to
overfitting, this research applied clustering ensembles that were generated using bagging.
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A third issue in intrusion detection is adversarial evasion. To avoid detection,
attackers may attack the intrusion detection system itself. Attacks against intrusion
detection systems include evasion, tampering, and denial of service (Laskov &
Lippmann, 2010; Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Vasilomanolakis,
Karuppayah, Mühlhäuser, & Fischer, 2015). Evasion amplifies the problem of overfitting
by preventing the detection of novel attacks (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). To address this
problem, this research used ensemble approaches, since they have been found effective in
resisting adversarial evasion (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). In addition, this
research applied active learning, which has been shown to allow adaptation to evasive
techniques (Miller et al., 2014).
A fourth issue in intrusion detection research is the use of a suitable dataset for
evaluation. Most early intrusion detection research used the KDD Cup 1999 dataset,
which was prepared from a DARPA packet capture for a KDD competition (Cao, Hoang,
Nguyen, 2013). The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been criticized because of its duplicate
records, its outdated information because of older technologies, and its high volume of
records (Qian, Xu, & Shi, 2006; Tavallaee et al., 2009; Creech & Hu, 2013). To address
this problem, a variety of researchers have created new intrusion detection evaluation
datasets. None of the newer datasets has received as much widespread popularity and
adoption as KDD Cup 1999. This research included a literature review of publicly
available intrusion detection datasets. As a result, the NSL-KDD dataset was used for
preliminary evaluation and the UNSW-NB15 dataset for evaluation with a more
contemporary dataset (Tavallaee et al., 2009; Moustafa & Slay, 2015).
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Definition of Terms
Accuracy: The ratio of the number of true positive and true negative results compared to
the number of all results.
Active Learning: A semi-supervised machine learning approach in which a subset of
unknown data is selected and presented to an oracle for labeling during training.
Alert: A notification or warning, which in the context of intrusion detection, represents a
potential cyberattack.
Anomaly: An event that deviates from a normal event.
Attack: An aggressive action against a computer system that may include unauthorized
modification of files to allow unauthorized access to system information,
unauthorized access or modification of user information, unauthorized
modification of information in network components, or unauthorized use of
system resources, including unauthorized account creation (Chebrolu, Abraham,
& Thomas, 2005).
Bagging: A machine learning method that provides a random subset of features and
records to a machine learning algorithm with a goal of reducing overfitting.
Bayes Theorem: Methods of probabilistic inference that calculate a prior probability of a
hypothesis based on evidence gathered from observations (Kruegel et al., 2003).
Bayesian Networks: Directed acyclic graphs, where each node in the graph represents a
conditional probability table (Kruegel et al., 2003).
Clustering: Finding natural groupings in data such that data within each cluster is most
similar to other data in that cluster and most dissimilar to the data of other clusters
(Zhou & Tang, 2006; Jain, 2010).
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Clustering Ensemble: An approach to clustering that uses combinations of multiple
partitions of clustering results to find a consensus partition that improves accuracy
compared to an individual clustering result (Topchy, Jain, & Punch, 2005; Ayad
& Kamel, 2010).
Cyber Situation Awareness: A specialized application of situation awareness that
applies to the analysis of cyberattacks and their impact on computer and network
operations (Li et al., 2010; Erbacher et al., 2010).
Cyberattack: See Attack.
Ensemble: A multi-learner system, where each component learner attempts to solve the
same task as the others (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002).
Evasion: Deceiving an intrusion detection system or rending it ineffective through the
modification of training or testing data (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al.,
2014; Laskov & Lippman, 2010).
False Positive: In the context of intrusion detection, a condition in which a predicted
class indicates an attack, but the actual class was normal.
Intrusion Detection: The practice of examining information from computers and
networks that are to be protected in order to identify attacks against those
computers and networks (Debar, Dacier, & Wespi, 1999).
KDD Cup 1999: A dataset that has been widely used in intrusion detection research.
Machine Learning: A field of computer science that uses algorithms to learn patterns
without being programmed with predefined rules.
Mirkin Distance: An algorithm for comparing two clusters by counting the number of
point pairs that are exclusive to each of the two clusters (Meilă, 2007).
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Oracle: An entity that represents a knowledgeable human subject matter expert and is
able to provide the correct label for a data record in response to a query.
Overfitting: A modeling error in which a machine learning algorithm is trained to match
a particular set of data but is not generalizable to other sets of data.
Partition: A set of clusters that represent the results from a single clustering algorithm.
Security Analyst: A job function that specializes in cyber defensive operations in the
context of a business or organization.
Security Monitoring: A job function of security analysts for detecting and responding to
potential cyberattacks.
Signature: A predefined pattern that matches characteristics of attacks.
Situation Awareness: The perception of information in an environment for a given time
and space, the comprehension of the meaning of that information, and the
projection of the future conditions in order to enable effective selection of an
appropriate course of action (Endsley, 1995; Tadda & Salerno, 2010).
Supervised Machine Learning: An approach to machine learning in which records with
known classes are used to train an algorithm so that it can then predict an output
for records with unknown classes.
Unsupervised Machine Learning: An approach to machine learning in which no
expected outcome is provided for training an algorithm.
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List of Acronyms
ANMI: Average Normalized Mutual Information
CSA: Cyber Situation Awareness
CSPA: Cluster-Based Similarity Partitioning Algorithm
CSV: Comma Separated Value
CTBN: Continuous Time Bayesian Networks
CVSS: Common Vulnerability Scoring System
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DOS: Denial of Service
EM: Expectation Maximization
FN: False Negative
FP: False Positive
GPU: Graphics Processing Unit
HGPA: Hypergraph Partitioning Algorithm
IDS: Intrusion Detection System
KDD: Knowledge Discovery in Databases
LAC: Locally Adaptive Clustering
LAN: Local Area Network
MCLA: Meta Clustering Algorithm
NM: Normalized Mutual Information
NMF: Nonnegative Matrix Factorization
QMI: Quadratic Mutual Information
ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristics
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SCANN: Stacking, Correspondence Analysis and Nearest Neighbor
SVM: Support Vector Machine
TN: True Negative
TP: True Positive
WBPA: Weighty Bipartite Partition Algorithm
WSBPA: Weighted Subspace Bipartite Partitioning Algorithm
WSPA: Weighty Similarity Partition Algorithm

Summary
This chapter introduced an approach to anomaly-based intrusion detection using
clustering ensembles. This chapter described how this research approached the problems
of too much data and high false positives rates. Finally, this chapter established the goal
of shifting the focus of intrusion detection from individual events to higher level of
meaning. This research explored how to predict the probability that a computer system
was under attack to enable security analysts to make better decisions under uncertain
conditions.
The remainder of this dissertation report provides the supporting background for
this research and describes the methodology that was used. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature that established the basis for this research. Chapter 3 describes the experiments
conducted to test the effectiveness of clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis for
intrusion detection as well as the testing approaches for evaluating the results. Chapter 4
presents the results of the experiments. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the conclusions of this
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research, the implications for future research, and recommendations for building upon the
foundation laid by this research.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview of Reviewed Topics
The focus of this research was to develop an intrusion detection system that
provides meaning for intrusion alerts by using clustering ensembles and probabilistic
analysis. To accomplish this research, the following areas of literature were examined to
synthesize these concepts:
•

Cyber Situation Awareness (CSA)

•

Intrusion Detection

•

Probabilistic Intrusion Detection

•

Clustering Ensembles

•

Intrusion Detection Datasets

Each of these areas has an established body of existing research. The following
sections describe the importance of each of these areas, review relevant research studies
in each topic, and synthesize the key concepts needed for building a foundation for this
research.
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Cyber Situation Awareness (CSA)
Background
Situation awareness is the perception of information in an environment for a given
time and space. It comprehends the meaning of information and projects the future
conditions to enable the effective selection of a course of action (Endsley, 1995; Tadda &
Salerno, 2010). Situation awareness is an essential function in various fields that require
the interpretation of information about the environment for effective decision-making
(Endsley, 1995). The goals of situation awareness are to identify what is happening, why
it is happening, what will happen next, and what can be done about it (Erbacher et al.,
2010). Seminal work in situation awareness was conducted by Endsley (1995) and
resulted in a theoretical model for use in discussion and future research. Endsley (1995)
developed a three-level model of situation awareness. At the first level, situation
awareness deals with perceiving the elements of the current situation. After the elements
are collected, the second level entails comprehension of the current situation. This second
level includes correlation and integration of data to achieve a higher level of
understanding (Erbacher et al., 2010). Finally, the third level focuses on projecting a
future state and the potential impact on future operations (Erbacher et al., 2010).
Decision-making regarding a course of action occurs after all three levels are developed
to some extent by analysts.
CSA is a specialized application of situation awareness that applies to a first-level
analysis of cyberattacks and their impact on computer and network operations (Li et al.,
2010; Erbacher et al., 2010). Improving CSA increases the effectiveness of security
analysts in dealing with attacks (Brynielsson, Frank, & Varga, 2016). CSA involves the
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interpretation of raw security events to identify malicious actors, legitimate users, and
system abnormalities in the context of system operating conditions and known
vulnerabilities (Erbacher et al., 2010).

Review of CSA Literature
Ensdley (1995) introduced the theory of situation awareness to address the
problem that there was no underlying theory that supported moving from discrete
observations to a comprehension of the overall situation. As a result, Endsley (1995)
defined a model for situation awareness to support future discussion and research. The
model contains three levels of situation awareness that are driven by goals, objectives,
and preconceived ideas: Level 1 deals with perceiving the elements of the current
situation; Level 2 entails comprehension of the current situation; and Level 3 focuses on
projecting a future state.
Ehrbacher et al. (2010) built upon Endsley’s (1995) research by applying the
model to CSA. Using cognitive task analysis, Ehrbacher et al. (2010) addressed the need
for improved decision making for security analysts. The results of this study found that
CSA includes impact identification, damage assessment, recovery, projection to the
future, as well as characterization of attacks and attackers (Erbacher et al., 2020). To
uncover the collaborative processes for threat analysts, Ahrend, Jirotka, and Jones (2016)
conducted interviews with threat analysts on their day-to-day practices. This study found
that too much data leads to decisions made with uncertainty and that information is
critical for reducing uncertainty at all stages of CSA (Ahrend et al., 2016). In addition,
Ahrend et al. (2016) found that analysts rely upon what they remember from their own
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past investigations. As a result, biases from past incidents may incorrectly inform future
decisions when evaluating alerts.
Gutzwiller, Hunt, and Lange (2016) used cognitive task analysis for studying
CSA but focused on determining the goals and information elements needed to make
decisions. The results demonstrated that CSA requires abstraction at several levels: 1) the
network as well as its architecture and state; 2) the world, including emergent threats,
abnormal behaviors, and attack signatures; and 3) the team, with a focus on how teams
work and how they hand-off work to each other (Gutzwiller et al., 2016). Similarly,
Newcomb, Hammell, and Hutchinson (2016) found that high levels of abstraction were
necessary to enable decision making in their experimental study that addressed the
problem of too many intrusion alerts for analysts to evaluate. Bartnes, Moe, and
Heegaard (2016) studied CSA with a goal of improving security incident response. Their
study used semi-structured interviews and found that, since there is an absence of major
events during normal operating conditions as well as a low priority for training, security
analysts are not prepared for incidents when they occur (Bartnes et al., 2016).
Rajivan and Cooke (2017) explored team-level CSA, including human
collaboration and information sharing. Using constructs of shared mental models,
transactive memory, and interactive team cognition, this study used a combination of
cognitive task analysis and event analysis of systemic teamwork (EAST) to empirically
test the results (Rajivan & Cooke, 2017). This study found that the role of teamwork is
important for CSA at every level of cybersecurity defense (Rajivan & Cooke, 2017).
Zhong et al. (2017) captured the cognitive processes of security analysts involved in
triaging security alerts. This study created a framework for retrieving data that is relevant
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to the triage process to provide context for alerts (Zhong et al., 2017). In addition, this
study created a system with a user interface that automatically identified the information
that analysts required for decision-making (Zhong et al., 2017).
Table 1 summarizes literature from empirical CSA studies. Results from these
studies are important in characterizing the meaning of intrusion alerts in the context of
CSA.

Table 1
Summary of CSA Literature
Study

Problem

Methodology

Findings or Contributions

Erbacher et
al. (2010)

Need for
improved
decision making
for security
analysts

Cognitive task
analysis

CSA goals include impact
identification, damage assessment,
recovery, projection to the future,
and characterization of attacks and
attackers.

Ahrend et al.
(2016)

Uncover
collaborative
processes for
threat analysts

Interviews
with threat
analysts on
day-to-day
practices

Too much data leads to making
decisions under uncertainty.
Information is critical to reducing
uncertainty at all stages. Analysts
rely upon what they remember from
their own past investigations.

Gutzwiller et
al. (2016)

Determine the
Cognitive task
goals and
analysis
information
elements needed
for CSA

Abstraction for CSA includes: 1) the
network and its architecture and
state; 2) the world, including
emergent threats, abnormal
behaviors, and attack signatures; 3)
and the team, with a focus on how
the team works and hands-off work
to each other.

20
Table 1
Summary of CSA Literature (cont.)
Study

Problem

Methodology

Findings or Contributions

Newcomb et
al. (2016)

Too many
intrusion alerts
for security
analysts to
evaluate

Experimental
study

CSA requires a high level of
abstraction to enable decisionmaking. CVSS scores are not a good
indicator of vulnerabilities for CSA.

Bartnes,
Moe, &
Heegaard
(2016)

How to improve Semisecurity incident structured
response
interviews

Absence of major events prevents
preparation for security incidents,
and training for security incidents is
not a priority in organizations.

Rajivan &
Cooke
(2017)

Understanding
the role of
teamwork in
CSA

Teamwork is important for
improving CSA at every level of
cybersecurity defense processes.
Limitations in teamwork have a
detrimental impact on defense.

Cognitive task
analysis and
event analysis
of systemic
teamwork

Discussion
CSA must consider the network topology (Brynielsson et al., 2016),
vulnerabilities (Erbacher et al., 2010), cyber personas (Brynielsson et al., 2016), and the
current threat landscape (Gutzwiller et al., 2016). In addition, CSA must include a time
component that considers near real-time events, mid-term events, and long-term events
(Brynielsson et al., 2016). Taking all of this information and the various time views into
account, CSA requires a high level of abstraction that enables human decision-making
(Ergacher et al., 2010; Gutzwiller et al., 2016; Newcomb et al., 2016).
In addition to technical security monitoring systems, CSA relies upon a variety of
techniques for understanding current and projected conditions. These techniques include:
timelines of attacks (Erbacher et al., 2010), attack trees (Li et al., 2010), kill chains
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(Bhatt, Yano, Amorim, & Gustavsson, 2014), Bayesian networks (Franke & Brynielsson,
2014), and the diamond model (Al-Mohannadi et al., 2016). CSA requires both statistical
techniques for understanding events and human knowledge to learn about novel attacks
(Tadda & Salerno, 2010).
CSA is a challenging practice for a variety of reasons. Most current work in
cybersecurity monitoring focuses on single, isolated attacks and does not develop a full
comprehension of the current situation or the projected state (Tadda & Salerno, 2010).
The volume of computer and network data and alerts makes it impossible for security
analysts to know the detailed operation of each computer in a network (Li et al., 2010).
CSA relies upon uncertain, imperfect information (Li et al., 2010). As new information
becomes available, security analysts must update their existing beliefs to address the
uncertainty (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). In addition, CSA is challenging because, under
normal conditions, there is an absence of major security incidents. As a result, security
analysts often lack preparation, training, and documentation to support CSA when
cyberattacks occur (Bartnes et al., 2016).
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Intrusion Detection
Background
Intrusion detection is the practice of examining information from computers and
networks to identify attacks (Debar et al., 1999). Intrusion detection identifies anomalies
that represent computer network intrusions or uses signature-based approaches that detect
patterns that match known intrusion techniques (Mukherjee, Heberlein, & Levitt, 1994).
An important factor in detecting intrusions is deciding the source of data that will be
monitored. Intrusion detection systems generally perform either network-based or hostbased intrusion detection (Mukherjee et al., 1994). A variety of attacks may be found by
intrusion detection systems, including: 1) unauthorized modification of files to allow
unauthorized access to system information; 2) unauthorized access or modification of
user information; 3) unauthorized modification of information in network components;
and 4) unauthorized use of system resources, including unauthorized account creation
(Chebrolu et al., 2005).
Intrusion detection systems are divided into signature-based detection and
anomaly detection. Signature-based systems rely upon predefined patterns that match the
characteristics of attacks. Anomaly detection learns normal patterns and detects patterns
that have not been encountered or predefined. Both signature-based detection and
anomaly detection have advantages and disadvantages (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Intrusion
detection is also categorized by the means in which data is collected as either networkbased or host-based. Xiao, Chen, and Chang (2014) provide a more comprehensive
listing of types of intrusion detection systems, including: 1) network-based, 2) hostbased, 3) stack-based, 4) protocol-based, and 5) graph based.
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Table 2
Summary of Machine Learning Approaches to Intrusion Detection
School of
Thought
Symbolist

Algorithms

Research Studies

Decision trees,
random forests

Sinclair, Pierce, & Matzner (1999); Zhang,
Zulkernine, & Haque (2008); Sindhu, Geetha, &
Kannan (2012); McElwee (2017)

Connectionist

Neural networks,
self-organizing
maps, deep
neural networks

Cannady (1998); Rhodes, Mahaffey, & Cannady
(2000); Stopel, Boger, Moskovitch, Shahar, &
Elovici (2006); Ahmad, Abdullah, & Alghamdi
(2009); Daliran, Nassiri, & Latif-Shabgahi (2010);
Sindhu et al. (2012); McElwee & Cannady (2016);
McElwee et al. (2017)

Evolutionary

Immune system,
evolutionary
neural networks,
genetic
programming

Dasgupta & González (2002); Han & Cho (2005);
Song, Heywood, & Zincir-Heywood (2005); Toosi
& Kahani (2007); Sindhu et al. (2012)

Bayesian

Bayesian
networks, naïve
Bayes

Valdes & Skinner (2000); Kruegel et al. (2003);
Feng, Guan, Guo, Gao, & Liu (2004); Gowadia,
Farkas, & Valtorta (2005); Tylman (2008);
Perdisci, Ariu, Fogla, Giacinto, & Lee (2009); Xu
& Shelton (2010); Koc, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani
(2012); Yassin, Udzir, Muda, & Sulaiman (2013)

Analogistic

Support vector
machine (SVM)

Mukkamala, Janoski, & Sung (2002); Chen, Hsu, &
Shen (2005); Tsang, Kwok, & Cheung (2005);
Khan, Awad, & Thuraisingham (2007)

Machine learning approaches can be divided into five primary schools of thought,
as shown in Table 2: symbolist, connectionist, evolutionary, Bayesian, and analogistic
(Domingos, 2015, p. 239). The symbolist approach uses inverse deduction with
approaches like decision trees. The connectionist approach commonly applies neural
networks and back propagation (Domingos, 2015, p. 239). Evolutionary machine learning
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was inspired by Alan Turing (1950) and uses principles of biological evolution like
random populations, mutation, and survival of the fittest. Bayesians, on the other hand,
rely on probabilistic inference, as developed by Thomas Bayes and formalized by PierreSimon Laplace (McGrayne, 2014, p. 159). Finally, the analogistic approach relies on the
similarity between objects and uses tools like support vector machines (Domingos, 2015,
p. 239).

Review of Literature on Machine Learning for Intrusion Detection
Pioneering work in intrusion detection began with Denning and Neumann (1985)
and was further developed by Denning (1987). This work sought to detect abnormal
patterns of system behaviors that may represent security violations. This initial work
resulted in an expert system that was expanded upon by Lunt (1990) and was
subsequently developed into network-based intrusion detection (Heberlein et al., 1990).
The remainder of this subsection reviews literature that applied machine learning to
intrusion detection, excluding Bayesian approaches, which are covered in the next
section. This literature review is presented in chronological order, but in most cases, the
literature does not build upon previous research. Instead each applies different types and
combinations of machine learning to the general problem of intrusion detection pioneered
by Denning and Neumann (1985).
Cannady (1998) conducted pioneering work in the application of machine
learning to intrusion detection. This study applied neural networks to supervised misuse
detection and achieved a detection accuracy of 97.5% for testing data. Sinclairet al.
(1999) used both symbolist and evolutionary approaches by combining decision trees and
genetic algorithms. This study found that, when combined, these two methods were
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useful for defining network connection rules that could be used to create expert systems
(Sinclair et al., 1999). Applying neural networks in a novel approach, Rhodes et al.
(2000) applied Kohonen self-organizing maps to unsupervised intrusion detection. This
study found that training self-organizing maps based on normal operating conditions
allowed the unsupervised detection of buffer overflow attacks, which had not been
present in the training data (Rhodes et al., 2000). Using evolutionary approaches,
Dasgupta and González (2002) used an immune system model for intrusion detection and
found that positive characterization was more precise than negative characterization but
required more resources.
Mukkamala et al. (2002) applied SVMs to intrusion detection and evaluated their
effectiveness using the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Their study compared the results of
SVMs to neural networks and found that the accuracy was comparable, but SVMs were
limited by their binary output (Mukkamala et al., 2002).
Julisch and Dacier (2002) and Julisch (2003) studied how to cluster intrusion
detection system alerts for root cause analysis. These studies found that by iteratively
identifying alerts that could be categorized as low criticality or false positives, clustering
reduced the quantity of alerts that required review by human analysts (Julisch & Dacier,
2002; Julisch, 2003).
Chen et al. (2005) used SVMs and compared their accuracy to neural networks.
Although Mukkamala et al. (2002) found comparable results between SVMs and neural
networks, Chen et al. (2005) found that SVMs outperformed the neural networks in terms
of detection accuracy.
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Han and Cho (2005) applied evolutionary neural networks to intrusion detection
using the IDEVAL dataset. This study found that using an evolutionary algorithm for
defining the structure of the neural network reduced the required training time and
improved detection accuracy (Han & Cho, 2005). Also using an evolutionary approach,
Song et al. (2005) used genetic programing and applied it to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
They found that hierarchical genetic programming was successful in detecting previously
unseen attacks (Song et al., 2005).
Using an analogistic approach, Tsang et al. (2005) used SVMs for intrusion
detection. They introduced a new algorithm, called a Core Vector Machine, which
reduced the computational complexity of the training process (Tsang et al., 2005). Stopel
et al. (2006) compared neural networks, k-nearest neighbor, and decision trees to detect
computer worms. They found that both neural networks and k-nearest neighbor had
similar accuracy and that neural networks performed classification faster than k-nearest
neighbor (Stopel et al., 2006). Neural networks are generally slower to train than other
algorithms because of many iterations of back propagation, so their conclusion that
neural networks were faster to train is surprising.
Several researchers have combined multiple machine learning methods for
detecting intrusions. As an example, Khan et al. (2007) combined hierarchical clustering
with support vector machines and found that it improved the overall accuracy. Similarly,
Toosi and Kahani (2007) combined soft computing methods for classification with a
genetic algorithm for fuzzy inference and found that this combination successfully
detected normal events and denial of service attacks. Zhang et al. (2008) combined
multiple approaches by applying random forests simultaneously to misuse and anomaly
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detection. They found that the combination had a higher detection rate and a lower false
positive rate than either independent approach (Zhang et al., 2008).
Hu, Hu, Xie, and Maybank (2009) found that hierarchical graph-theoretic
clustering was effective in active learning for intrusion detection. Ahmad et al. (2009)
focused on detecting denial of service attacks using neural networks. They found that
neural networks were capable of very high detection rates, except for teardown attacks
(Ahmad et al., 2009). Daliran et al. (2010) used neural networks for intrusion detection
but used them for detection of malicious code in a honeypot environment. They found
that neural networks achieved 80% accuracy when using labeled data from this
environment (Daliran et al., 2010).
Sindhu et al. (2012) combined three different schools of thought by applying
genetic algorithms, neural networks, and decision trees simultaneously. This study used
the genetic algorithm for feature selection, followed by a neural network for
preprocessing the data (Sindhu et al., 2012). Finally, this study used a decision tree to
classify the data and found that it had a higher detection rate than using either a neural
network or a C4.5 classifier independently (Sindhu et al., 2012).
Clustering is another machine learning approach that has been applied to intrusion
detection. Dubey and Dubey (2015) used clustering to preprocess data for machine
learning for intrusion detection. Li, Kao, Zhang, Chuang, and Yen (2015) also used
clustering but applied it to network flow data, which was effective in detecting botnet
activity. Silva and Hruschka (2016) found that SLS-IBkM clustering was effective for
data streams, including the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Expanding upon the work of Rhodes
et al. (2000) in using self-organizing maps for intrusion detection, McElwee and Cannady
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(2016) focused on preprocessing intrusion detection data for imbalanced datasets. They
found that filtering normal events and using Principal Component Analysis for feature
reduction prior to training Kohonen self-organizing maps improved the detection
accuracy and reduced the clustering time (McElwee & Cannady, 2016).
McElwee (2017) applied active learning to random forest classification by
beginning with unlabeled data and presenting a subset of the data to an oracle for
labeling. This study found that by using k-means clustering to select a sample for the
oracle, 90% the KDD Cup 1999 records could be classified accurately by manually
labeling 0.13% of the total records (McElwee, 2017). Finally, expanding on the approach
of Julisch (2003) in categorizing alerts, McElwee et al. (2017) applied deep neural
networks to classifying alerts from a signature-based intrusion detection system and
found that they were highly accurate for categorizing alerts. This approach was
successful for assigning alerts to the appropriate security analysts as well as for
automating routine reporting tasks (McElwee, Heaton, Fraley, & Cannady, 2017).

Discussion
Regardless of the approach used, intrusion detection systems can be evaluated
using several different measures. Koc et al. (2012) highlight important evaluation criteria,
including accuracy, error rate, and the area under receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curve. For binary classification, Figure 3 shows the possible outcomes of intrusion
detection (Koc et al., 2012).
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Figure 3. Confusion matrix for binary classification

Using the criteria shown in Figure 3, it follows that accuracy can be defined as the
number of true positives (TP) and true negatives (TN) divided by all possible outcomes:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(1)

Further, it follows that, given the accuracy, the error rate can be described as:
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦

(2)

Intrusion detection is an area of research that faces several on-going challenges.
One of the most important research challenges is the reduction of false positives. Most
false positives are generated because of under-specified signatures, intent guessing, and
limited abstraction capability (Gowadia et al., 2005). To address the problem of false
positives, some studies have focused on identifying the attackers rather than including all
events across all computers and users (Burroughs, Wilson, & Cybenko, 2002). In
addition, intrusions are rare and may be hidden in massive amounts of data (Scott, 2004).
As a result, the prior probability of an attack is very low, so even a highly accurate
intrusion detection system will have high false positive rates (Kruegel et al., 2003).
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Another challenge in intrusion detection is the large amount of data and the
repetitive work of analyzing and prioritizing the events. Sawyer et al. (2014) found that
after prolonged monitoring activity, there was a noticeable drop in the accuracy of
security analysts. Thus, for routine monitoring of intrusion detection alerts, solutions that
require less human interaction are beneficial. The amount of data is voluminous and
contains redundant features, which also makes detection difficult for intrusion detection
systems because of imbalanced and irrelevant data (Chebrolu et al., 2005).
Finally, intrusion detection systems may be considered high value targets for
attackers. Intrusion detection systems are subject to adversarial evasion, including
deceiving the intrusion detection system or rendering it ineffective (Šrndić & Laskov,
2014; Wang et al., 2014). Laskov and Lippman (2010) found that adversaries may
attempt to modify the training or testing data to alter the detection results. As a result,
intrusion detection must utilize robust classifiers capable of dealing with attacks and
uncertainty.
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Probabilistic Intrusion Detection
Background
Probabilistic methods for intrusion detection apply statistical formulas and
algorithms. Bayes theorem refers to methods of probabilistic inference that were initially
developed by Thomas Bayes and later formalized by Pierre-Simon Laplace (McGrayne,
2014, p. 159). The purpose of Bayes theorem and Bayesian networks is to allow the
calculation of a prior probability of a hypothesis based on evidence gathered from
observations (Kruegel et al., 2003). Bayesian updating is the process of estimating the
probability of a hypothesis given that an event has been observed (Kruegel et al., 2003;
Chivers, Clark, Nobles, Shaikh, & Chen, 2013). Bayesian approaches also allow the
combination of information from several sources (Scott, 2004; Chivers et al., 2013).
Bayesian methods are preferable over frequency-based statistics for intrusion
detection, since frequency-based methods are more prone to evasion (Swarnkar &
Hubballi, 2016). In addition, Bayesian methods provide a simple way to include prior
information (Scott, 2004) and allow knowledge representation that enables reasoning
with uncertain information (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Probabilistic methods, like Bayes
theorem, allow intrusions to be detected based on soft evidence, or beliefs, rather than
hard evidence (Gowadia et al., 2005). This allows attacks to be presented as probabilities
rather than as binary decisions (Gowadia et al., 2005).
Probabilistic methods help to address the challenges of intrusion detection, in that
there are massive amounts of data, but criminal intrusions are rare (Scott, 2004). This
data imbalance contributes to the base rate fallacy, which shows that even a highly
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accurate intrusion detection system will have a high false positive rate (Kruegel et al.,
2003). In formal terms:
P(𝐵|𝐴) =

P(𝐴|𝐵)P(𝐵)
P(𝐴)

(3)

Thus, if the prior probability of an actual intrusion event, P(B), is extremely low,
it will force P(B|A) to be low, making detection more challenging. Perdisci et al. (2009)
found that a false positive rate for imbalanced data must therefore be 10-5 or lower. As a
result, detecting intrusions for rare attacks is more challenging than for common attacks,
since one of the goals of intrusion detection is to keep false alarms low (Pajouh,
Dastghaibyfard, & Hashemi, 2017).
One probabilistic approach is the use of Bayesian networks, which are directed
acyclic graphs, where each node in the graph represents a conditional probability table
(Kruegel et al., 2003). Another probabilistic approach is naïve Bayes, which is the
simplest Bayesian classifier and performs well for datasets that have conditional
independence of their features (Koc et al., 2012). A variation of naïve Bayes is hidden
naïve Bayes, which creates an additional layer to represent a hidden parent for each node
(Koc et al., 2012).
Bayesian approaches show promise for intrusion detection, but there are many
challenges as well. One problem with Bayesian networks is their node ordering
requirement, which may require expert knowledge to develop (Chebrolu et al., 2005) or
the use of an additional algorithm that can estimate the node ordering (Gowadia et al.,
2005). Another challenge with some Bayesian approaches is the computational
complexity, especially for Type 2 algorithms, where the order is not given, which exhibit
O(N4) complexity (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Bayesian networks are also known to have
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suboptimal models that require large training datasets, which may not be available in
intrusion detection for rare attacks, thus requiring additional methods to alleviate this
constraint (Xiao et al., 2014).

Review of Probabilistic Intrusion Detection Literature
Helman and Liepins (1993) provided a foundational paper for statistical-based
intrusion detection that other researchers have built upon. Valdes and Skinner (2000)
addressed the shortcomings of anomaly and signature-based detection by modeling
attacks as hypothesis and using events to adapt probabilities. This study found that
combining signature-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection using probabilities
improved the detection of distributed attacks (Valdes & Skinner, 2000).
Bayesian networks have been applied to intrusion detection in a variety of
research studies. Kruegel et al. (2003) used full Bayesian networks to model
interdependencies of events and found a reduction in false alerts. Feng et al. (2004) found
that dynamic Bayesian networks for recognizing time-varying plans were effective for
predicting normal and anomalous call sequences. Gowadia et al. (2005) used agent
graphs and Bayesian networks to evaluate beliefs, rather than hard values. This study
found that Bayesian networks can be created by asking experts to create directed acyclic
graphs either manually or by using an algorithm (Gowadia et al., 2005). Tylman (2008)
combined misuse and anomaly detection methods, similar to Valdes and Skinner (2000).
This combined approach used Bayesian classification of Snort alerts at the session level
and found that it uncovered the structure of belief networks (Tylman, 2008).
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Perdisci et al. (2009) applied Bayesian methods to combine the results of an
ensemble of support vector machine classifiers. The goal of this research was to reduce
false positives, and the results demonstrated high accuracy, especially for shellcode and
polymorphic attacks (Perdisci et al., 2009). Xu and Shelton (2010) used continuous time
Bayesian networks (CTBN) for anomaly detection. This application of Bayesian
networks focused purely on event timing and outperformed existing methods for anomaly
detection (Xu & Shelton, 2010).
Koc et al. (2012) used hidden naïve Bayes for improving the accuracy of intrusion
detection. This study found that hidden naïve Bayes outperformed naïve Bayes for
accuracy and error rate while maintaining the simplicity of naïve Bayes (Koc et al.,
2012). Chivers et al. (2013) focused specifically on the problem of detecting insider
attacks. This research study combined sources using hypotheses and Bayesian updating
and found that updating beliefs based on evidence is effective in detecting attacker nodes
(Chivers et al., 2013).
Yassin et al. (2013) used k-means clustering to separate data and subsequently
used Bayes classification. Their study found that using clustering as an initial step
significantly reduced the false positive rate and increased the true negative rate (Yassin et
al., 2013). Xiao et al. (2014) addressed the shortcoming of Bayesian networks using an
ensemble approach. Bayesian network model averaging selects the best network from a
set of trained networks and performs better than regular Bayesian networks or naïve
Bayes (Xiao et al., 2014). Bayesian network model averaging requires less data for
training, so it is effective for smaller training data sets (Xiao et al., 2014).
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Swarnkar and Hubballi (2016) used multinomial Bayesian one-class classifiers of
n-grams with probability trees to address the shortcomings of frequency-based and oneclass classifiers. Although this approach had a high detection rate, it was accompanied
with a moderately high false positive rate and high computational complexity (Swarnkar
& Hubballi, 2016). As a result, this approach is not suitable for intrusion detection, since
moderately high false positive rates for highly imbalanced datasets results in much lower
overall accuracy (Kruegel et al., 2003). To address the problem of high computational
complexity and the problem of imbalanced datasets, Pajouh et al. (2017) used two-tier
classification with linear discriminant analysis. This study found that linear discriminant
analysis provided optimal feature reduction and made naïve Bayes more efficient for
classification (Pajouh et al., 2017).

Discussion
Several important themes can be established from previous research. First,
intrusion detection using probabilistic methods should avoid generalization across an
entire dataset, since it makes it easier for criminals to hide (Scott, 2004). For example,
data can be segmented to look at anomalies per user (Scott, 2004; Dash, Reddy, & Pujari,
2011) or per host (Burroughs et al., 2002; Chivers et al., 2013). Second, time is an
important element that should be considered, with a preference to more recent behaviors
(Scott, 2004; Xu & Shelton, 2010; Chivers et al., 2013). Third, categorical data has been
shown to perform better than parametric or continuous data for probabilistic methods for
detecting intrusions (Scott, 2004). Fourth, several previous studies found that
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probabilistic methods were successful in combining information from several sources,
which is useful for aggregating event-level information to create a more abstract level.

Clustering Ensembles
Background
The purpose of clustering is to understand natural groupings in data (Jain, 2010).
Clustering algorithms divide data into clusters, such that the data within each cluster is
most similar to other data in the cluster, and the data between clusters is most dissimilar
to that of other clusters (Zhou & Tang, 2006). Clusters in data appear in various shapes,
sizes, sparseness, and degrees of separation (Fred & Jain, 2005). Clustering identifies
natural structures in data when the structure, the number of clusters, or shapes of the
clusters may be unknown (Dimitriadou, Weingessel, & Hornik, 2001). Thus, clustering is
a primary technique for unsupervised machine learning (Zhou & Tang, 2006). In addition
to finding natural groupings and structure in data, clustering can perform natural
classification or compression of data into cluster prototypes (Jain, 2010).
A wide variety of clustering algorithms exist, but most can be placed into four
categories. First, iterative square-error partitional clustering, such as k-means clustering,
finds a distance between centroids and data elements and does not impose a structure on
the data (Frossyniotis, Likas, & Stafylopatis, 2004; Jain, 2010). Since iterative squareerror partitional clustering uses a distance measure, it creates hyperspherical clusters and
does not identify novel cluster shapes (Fred & Jain, 2005). Second, hierarchical
clustering organizes data into nested sequences of groups that can be visualized as trees
(Frossyniotis et al., 2004). Third, density-based clustering finds the densest regions of the
feature space that are separated by low density space (Jain, 2010). Fourth, grid-based
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clustering uses spatial data mining techniques to subdivide a hyperspace into sections that
represent clusters (Frossyniotis et al., 2004).
Clustering is considered a difficult problem (Jain, 2010). As a form of
unsupervised learning, it is hard to select a clustering method in advance that can identify
the same clusters that match those identified by a human expert (Ayad & Kamel, 2008).
Clustering results for different clustering algorithms may be very different using the same
data (Jain, 2010). Further, different clustering runs using the same clustering algorithm
can have different results because of different initialization parameters (Dimitriadou et
al., 2001).
There is no best clustering algorithm (Jain, 2010). No single algorithm exists that
can identify all of the cluster shapes and structures (Fred & Jain, 2005). No clustering
method is available that will find the correct underlying structure for all data sets (VegaPons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 337). As a result, researchers have found it is best to
use several different clustering algorithms on a given data set and see what works best
(Fred & Jain, 2005). Clustering algorithms are generally optimization problems that
reduce mean-square error, minimize some other type of error, or use similarity functions
(Dimitriadou et al., 2001). The quality of clustering can be evaluated using R-squared,
intra-over inter-variation quotient, BD-index, and SD validity index (Frossyniotis et al.,
2004).
Ensemble approaches have been applied to address many of the challenges
associated with clustering. An ensemble is a multi-learner system, where each component
learner attempts to solve the same task as the others (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). Clustering
ensembles were the result of research in multiple classifier systems (Dimitriadou et al.,
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2001; Hadjitodorov, Kuncheva, & Todorova, 2006). The goal of clustering ensembles is
to find a combination of multiple partitions that improves the overall clustering of the
data (Topchy et al., 2005). As a result, clustering ensembles find a consensus partition
that improves that accuracy of individual clustering results (Ayad & Kamel, 2010).
Different clustering algorithms produce different clustering results, and different
runs of the same algorithm provide different results, because of different initialization
parameters. Thus, using multiple clustering approaches simultaneously helps to find the
best clustering solution (Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Jain, 2010). The benefit of clustering
ensembles is that the decision of a group may be more reliable than that of any individual
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 338). As a result, clustering ensembles reduce
the risk of picking the wrong clustering method for a given dataset (Hadjitodorov et al.,
2006).
Previous research has applied clustering ensembles to face recognition, character
recognition, scientific image analysis, and medical diagnosis (Zhou & Tang, 2006).
Research has also evaluated clustering ensembles with large datasets and has found an
improvement in clustering, even for incomplete partitions (Lourenco et al., 2015).
Clustering ensembles can find the right number of clusters in data (Dimitriadou et al.,
2001; Ayad & Kamel, 2010). They also improve the quality and robustness of clustering
(Strehl & Ghosh, 2002; Topchy et al., 2005; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 365;
Lourenco et al., 2015). Clustering ensembles identify hidden structures in data (Bakker &
Heskes, 2003) and find clusters of arbitrary and complex shapes (Dimitriadou et al.,
2001; Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). As a result, they enable new
insights into a dataset and lower the prediction error (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Because
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of their diversity of clustering solutions, clustering ensembles, are more generalizable
than individual clustering algorithms (Zhou & Tang, 2006). Finally, clustering ensembles
can be implemented in a distributed computing environment, allowing them to scale well
for large ensembles (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002).
Clustering ensembles can be viewed as a two-step process. The first step is to
generate the various clustering results, also known as partitions, and the second step is to
evaluate the results using a consensus function (Topchy, Law, Jain, & Fred, 2004; VegaPons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 338). Figure 4 shows how these two steps fit into the
overall concept of clustering ensembles and the notations that are used in this paper,
which have been adapted from Vega-Pons and Ruiz-Shulcloper (2011, p. 339).

Figure 4. Overview clustering ensembles with formal notation

In this notation, 𝑋 = {𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 } is a set of objects in which each 𝑥𝑖 is a
multi-dimensional tuple of α dimensions and where 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛. ℙ𝑋 is the set of all
possible partitions in X, and ℙ = {P1, P2,…., Pm} is the set of partitions generated by the
cluster generation process, such that ℙ ∈ ℙ𝑋 . As a result, each partition, 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ, is made
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up of multiple symbolic cluster labels, 𝐶𝑗𝑖 , such that 𝑃𝑖 = {𝐶1𝑖 , 𝐶2𝑖 , … . , 𝐶𝑑𝑖 } is a set of
objects in X with d clusters. In Figure 4, each partition can have varying numbers of
clusters, so the final element in the set is represented as 𝐶𝑝1, 𝐶𝑞2, and 𝐶𝑟𝑚, where 𝑚 = |ℙ|,
The variables p, q, and r, are arbitrary numbers of clusters produced in each partition,
such that 𝐶𝑗𝑖 represents the jth cluster in ith partition, 𝑃𝑖 . The objective of clustering
ensembles is to find a consensus partition by evaluating the partitions, 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ, to find a
clustering result, 𝑃 ∗ ∈ ℙ𝑋 , where 𝑃∗ is a better clustering solution than any 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ.
The cluster generation step creates multiple partitions, ℙ ∈ ℙ𝑋 , that can be used to
find the final clustering solution, 𝑃 ∗ ∈ ℙ𝑋 . There are few constraints on how the clusters
are generated (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 340). The most important
requirement of cluster generation is that multiple, diverse partitions are created (Strehl &
Ghosh, 2002). Without diverse partitions, clustering ensembles will not be able to
outperform single clustering algorithms (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). The initial partitions
can be thought of as noisy versions of true partitions (Topchy et al., 2004). As a result,
weak and less computationally expensive clustering algorithms can be used in the initial
cluster generation with comparable or better results than an individual clustering
algorithm (Topchy et al., 2005).
A variety of approaches exist for creating a diverse initial set of partitions. One
approach for creating diverse partitions is to use different clustering algorithms
(Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). For
example, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) implemented k-means and a competitive learning
algorithm to generate diverse initial partitions. Another approach for creating diverse
partitions is to use different initialization parameters with the same clustering algorithm
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(Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). This is
commonly implemented using the k-means algorithm, since it has a variety of initial
parameters, is not computationally expensive, and is very popular (Jain, 2010).
Another widely used approach for generating diverse initial partitions is to use
different representations of the data (Jain, 2010). The different representations of the data
may include different subsets of features or a different subset of the objects in the dataset
(Fred & Jain, 2005; Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011).
Different representations of the data may also include projecting the data to different
feature spaces (Fred & Jain, 2005), using algorithms like Principal Component Analysis
(Strehl & Gosh, 2002). Examples of these approaches include random feature selection
(Strehl & Gosh, 2002), bootstrapping (Bakker & Heskes, 2003), boosting (Frossyniotis et
al., 2004), and bagging (Fred & Jain, 2005).
Bakker and Heskes (2003) found that bootstrapping allows local summaries that
are not possible for a single model and reduces model bias by creating a more complex
model. In addition, bootstrapping reduces the tendency to overfit, since the models are
not trained on the full data (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Frossyniotis et al. (2004) found that
boosting a clustering algorithm for a few iterations provided better results than running
the algorithm several times and choosing the best run.
The cluster evaluation step is one of the most difficult challenges in clustering
ensembles (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 341). For ensembles of classifiers,
there are labels, which make the evaluation step a straightforward problem. For clustering
ensembles, there are no labels, which results in a correspondence problem (Dimitriadou
et al., 2001; Strehl & Ghosh, 2002; Frossyniotis et al., 2004). Thus, cluster evaluation
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combines diverse partitions, without labeled data, to find the true underlying partition that
represent the natural organization of the data (Topchy et al., 2004; Tumer & Agogino,
2008).

Review of Clustering Ensemble Literature
The earliest clustering research began with Dimitriadou et al. (2001). This
seminal work addressed the problem that there was no clear way to combine results from
different clustering algorithms to find a clear partition (Dimitriadou et al., 2001). Using
voting, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) found that clustering ensembles were effective in
finding fuzzy partitions and in finding the right number of clusters. Although this study
was the earliest identified research on clustering ensembles, most subsequent work in
clustering ensembles built upon the work of Strehl and Ghosh (2002). Addressing the
same problem, Strehl and Ghosh (2002) created three new clustering algorithms: 1)
cluster-based similarity partitioning, 2) hypergraph partitioning, and 3) meta clustering.
They found that consensus clustering using ensembles using any of their heuristic
algorithms was better than individual clustering results (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002).
Bakker and Heskes (2003) contributed to ensemble-based approaches by applying
bootstrapping. They found that using bootstrapping to summarize large ensembles into
smaller numbers of representative models reduced overfitting, provided better prediction,
and detected hidden structures in the data (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Frossyniotis et al.
(2004) addressed the combination of multiple clustering solutions by using sequential
clustering with boosting and found that boost clustering improved the quality and
performance of clustering (Frossyniotis et al., 2004).
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Another important thread of literature emanated from Topchy et al. (2004). Their
research acknowledged that clustering ensembles work but addressed the problem that
there was no theoretical basis for why they worked (Topchy et al., 2004). This study used
both stochastic and mean partition generation and found that consensus solutions
converge to a true clustering solution as the number of partitions in the ensemble
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). They also found that the probability of not discovering
the true partition decreases exponentially as the number of partitions in the ensembles
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). Continuing this work, Fred and Jain (2005) addressed the
problem of identifying all cluster shapes and structures by using evidence accumulation.
As part of this research, they proposed a theoretical framework and provided criteria for
analysis of the combination of clustering results (Fred & Jain, 2005). Topchy et al. (2005)
examined how to combine partitions using a consensus function by using expectancy
maximization and mutual information consensus functions. They found that weak
partitions may be used in clustering ensembles and still achieve comparable or better
performance than single clustering approaches (Topchy et al., 2005).
Hadjitodorov et al. (2006) explored how to select partitions in clustering
ensembles by using a diversity measure. Using the Adjusted Rand Index, they found that
ensembles with a wide spread of individual diversity were better than ensembles with less
spread and that medium diversity clusters were the best approach (Hadjitodorov et al.,
2006). Zhou and Tang (2006) compared voting, weighted voting, selective weighting,
and selective weighted voting and found that selective weighted voting was significantly
better for cluster evaluation. Tumer and Agogino (2008) further compared a meta
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clustering algorithm to voting active clusters with reinforcement learning and found that
meta clustering was better.
Not all previous research focused on the approaches for combining clustering
results. Ayad and Kamel (2008) focused on reducing the computing complexity by
beginning with the idea that consensus clustering has O(n2) complexity. By applying
cumulative voting for identifying clustering solutions, this study improved accuracy and
reduced computational complexity to O(n) (Ayad & Kamel, 2008).
Azimi and Fern (2009) explored conflicting results regarding diversity of
clustering ensembles. By using adaptive clustering ensemble selection, this study
concluded that selection must be adaptive to accommodate the datasets, since no
approach worked consistently for all of the datasets that were studied (Azimi & Fern,
2009). Ayad and Kamel (2010) applied cumulative voting as a special case of linear
regression for finding the optimum labeling of clustering ensembles. This study found
that cumulative voting improved the accuracy and stability of results, as well provided an
accurate estimation of the number of clusters (Ayad & Kamel, 2010). Lourenco et al.
(2015) examined the problem that the clustering correspondence does not reflect
uncertainty. This study used a probabilistic interpretation of Evidence Accumulation
Clustering by using Bregman divergence and resulted in improved clustering, even for
incomplete partitions and large datasets (Lourenco et al., 2015).
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Review of Co-occurrence Consensus Function Literature
Co-occurrence consensus functions analyze the number of times objects belong to
clusters as well as the number of times two objects belong to the same clusters. Cooccurrence functions include: 1) relabeling and voting, 2) co-association matrix, 3) graph
and hypergraph, 4) Locally Adaptive Clustering (LAC) algorithms, 5) fuzzy methods, 6)
information theoretic methods, and 7) finite mixture models (Vega-Pons & RuizShulcloper, 2011, p. 353). Table 3 summarizes the co-occurrence consensus evaluation
methods using these categories.

Table 3
Summary of Co-Occurrence Cluster Evaluation Approaches
Method

Description

Studies

Relabeling and
Voting

Voting process after solving
labeling correspondence
problem

Dimitriadou et al. (2001); Zhou &
Tang (2006); Ayad & Kamel
(2008); Tumer & Agogino (2008)

Co-Association
Matrix

Cluster results into an
intermediate co-association
matrix

Fred & Jain (2005); Wang et al.
(2009)

Graph and
Hypergraph

Create graphs and
hypergraphs of partitions
and evaluate for consensus
partition

Strehl & Ghosh (2002); Fern &
Brodley (2004)

Locally Adaptive
Clustering (LAC)

Evaluate centroids and
weights for numerical data

Domeniconi & Al-Razgan (2009)

Fuzzy Methods

Evaluate clusters as soft
partitions rather than hard
partitions

Frossyniotis et al. (2004); Punera &
Ghosh (2008); Ayad & Kamel
(2010)
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Table 3
Summary of Co-Occurrence Cluster Evaluation Approaches (cont.)
Method

Description

Studies

Information
Theoretic

Minimize entropy within
partitions

Strehl & Ghosh (2002); Punera &
Ghosh (2008); Jain (2010)

Finite Mixture
Models

Probabilistic modeling of
subpopulations using a
mixture distribution

Topchy et al. (2005)

Among the relabeling and voting approaches, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) used
voting, based upon classification ensembles, followed by a merging procedure. Zhou and
Tang (2006) measured similarity by counting overlap within clusters and found that
selective weighted voting was the best of the approaches they evaluated. Ayad and Kamel
(2008) developed a relabeling and voting approach that used cumulative voting. Tumer
and Agogino (2008) used voting active clusters with reinforcement learning and used
average normalized mutual information (ANMI) as an objective function.
Co-association matrix approaches map clustering results into an intermediate
representation, called a co-association matrix (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p.
346). For example, Fred and Jain (2005) split the data into a large number of small
spherical clusters, using k-means clustering. Next, they combined the small clusters using
a similarity matrix. Because of this intermediate step, co-association approaches have a
complexity of O(n2) and are limited to smaller data sets. Wang, Yang, and Zhou (2009)
introduced probabilistic methods using a co-association matrix and introduced Bayesian
clustering ensembles.
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Cluster evaluation approaches that use graph and hypergraph methods transform
the partitions into a graph or hypergraph and cut the graph to obtain a consensus partition
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 347). Many of the foundational approaches to
cluster evaluation were developed by Strehl and Ghosh (2002), who developed three
different heuristics to evaluate hypergraphs: 1) cluster-based similarity partitioning
algorithm (CSPA), 2) hypergraph partitioning algorithm (HGPA), and 3) meta clustering
algorithm (MCLA). Similarly, Fern and Brodley (2004) used a graph partitioning
approach. This approach did not actually solve for normalized mutual information in
clusters, but instead acted more like a co-occurrence evaluation method (Vega-Pons &
Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 349).
LAC algorithms identify partitions within numerical features as two sets of
information: 1) the centroids identified in the clusters, and 2) their associated weights
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 355). Domeniconi and Al-Razgan (2009)
developed three consensus functions using this approach: 1) Weighty Similarity Partition
Algorithm (WSPA), 2) Weighty Bipartite Partition Algorithm (WBPA), and 3) Weighted
Subspace Bipartite Partitioning Algorithm (WSBPA). These algorithms were limited in
their use to numerical data and require that the number of clusters be specified initially
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 355).
Fuzzy methods rely on the soft nature of clustering approaches and recognize that
there may be “fuzzy” partitions in the data (Dimitriadou et al., 2001). Some clustering
algorithms that may be used in the cluster generation stage, such as fuzzy c-means and
EM, already produce soft clustering results (Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Vega-Pons & RuizShulcloper, 2011, p. 360). As a result, cluster evaluation methods that use fuzzy methods
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do not attempt to convert the initial soft-clustering results into hard clusters. Some fuzzy
consensus algorithms, such as voting, can perform soft or hard clustering (Ayad &
Kamel, 2010).
Information theoretic approaches minimize entropy within groupings (Jain, 2010).
Strehl and Ghosh (2002) used concepts from information theory and focused on
normalized mutual information (NMI) and average normalized mutual information
(ANMI) as objective functions. Punera and Ghosh (2008) used soft base clustering and
used an information theoretic approach.
Topchy et al. (2005) used a fusion method with probabilities and based their
solution to the consensus problem on a finite mixture model. The result was two new
consensus functions, called quadratic mutual information (QMI) and expectation
maximization (EM), that eliminated the need to solve the label correspondence problem
(Topchy et al., 2005). This approach required that the data be modeled as random,
independent variables and requires a fixed number of clusters in the final clustering
solution (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 353).

Review of Median Partition Cluster Evaluation Literature
Median partition-based approaches are optimization problems that maximize
similarity or minimize dissimilarity and can be divided into the following categories: 1)
genetic algorithms, 2) nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) methods, 3) kernel
models, and 4) Mirkin distance (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 350). Table 4
summarizes median partition-based cluster evaluation approaches using these categories.
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Table 4
Summary of Median Partition Cluster Evaluation Approaches
Method

Description

Studies

Genetic Algorithms

Utilize search capabilities of Yoon, Ahn, Lee, Cho, & Kim
genetic algorithms to
(2006); Luo, Jing, & Xie (2006);
minimize or maximize
Analoui & Sadighian (2006)
distance functions

Nonnegative Matrix
Factorization (NMF)

Find factors and
dissimilarity using a
nonnegative matrix

Li, Ding, & Jordan (2007)

Kernel Models

Similarity measure between
solutions with
approximation

Vega-Pons, Correa-Morris, & Ruiz
Schulcloper (2008, 2010)

Mirkin Distance

Counting pairs of points
within clusters and using a
symmetric distance metric

Gionis, Mannila, & Tsaparas
(2007)

Genetic algorithm approaches rely upon the search capabilities of genetic
algorithms and use the highest fitness value, after some stopping criterion is reached
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 354). What distinguishes genetic algorithm
approaches is the type of fitness function employed. One approach, called heterogeneous
clustering ensembles, used ordered pairs with a population generation mechanism and a
fitness function to evaluate the number of overlaps between partitions within each pair
(Yoon et al., 2006). Another approach used an information theoretic fitness function that
minimized entropy between partitions (Luo et al., 2006). Yet another approach
implemented the fitness function as a maximization of probability using a finite mixture
method (Analoui & Sadighian, 2006). A challenge in using genetic algorithms for cluster
evaluation is that different runs may produce different results because of the heuristic
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nature of these algorithms (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 354). It may also be
inferred that such algorithms may settle on local minima or maxima.
NMF methods for cluster evaluation have been used to create a median partition
using a non-negative matrix by finding factors of the matrix and a dissimilarity measure
between partitions (Li et al., 2007; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 357). Kernel
models have been used to create a median partition using a similarity measure between
partitions and find an approximate solution (Vega-Pons et al., 2010).
Mirkin distance approaches have been used to create a median partition by
counting pairs. Using this approach, given two clusters, C and C', where N01 is the
number of point pairs in C' but not in C, and N10 is the number of point pairs in the same
partition in C but not in C', then the Mirkin distance for comparing two clusters is M(C,
C') = 2(N01 + N10) (Meilă, 2007). When applied to clustering ensembles, the objective is
to minimize the Mirkin distance between the partitions, and a number of heuristic
approaches approximate this function (Gionis et al. 2007, Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper,
2011, p. 342).

Discussion
A number of design criteria should be considered when using clustering
ensembles. In cluster generation, one important consideration is the number of partitions
generated in the first stage. Dimitriadou et al. (2001) found through experimentation that
large numbers of clusters provided the best clustering solution. Topchy et al. (2004)
found that clustering ensembles converged more closely to a true clustering solution as
the number of partitions in the ensemble increased. The probability of not discovering the
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true partition decreases exponentially as the number of partitions in the ensemble
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). Another important consideration in the clustering
generation step is the diversity of partitions generated. There are conflicting results
related to the diversity of initial partitions (Azimi & Fern, 2009). Ensembles with a wide
spread of individual diversity are better than ensembles with less spread, but spread did
not relate to accuracy (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). As a result, medium diversity clusters
were found to be the best approach (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006).
In the cluster evaluation stage, there are several design criteria to consider. One
important consideration is the objective function for determining the quality of clustering,
such as a similarity or dissimilarity function (Zhou & Tang, 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons
& Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). Another important consideration is the stopping criterion for
determining when the best clustering solution has been identified (Dimitriadou et al.,
2001).
Finally, several cluster evaluation strategies are computationally complex. Most
consensus clustering algorithms have O(n2) complexity, although some have achieved
O(n) complexity (Ayad & Kamel, 2008). Thus, the selection of a cluster evaluation
strategy should be based on the volume of data and the computational cost of the
algorithm.
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Intrusion Detection Datasets
Background
Creating datasets for intrusion detection system evaluation is subjective, and new
datasets face several challenges. One of the primary challenges to obtaining realistic
intrusion data is privacy. This is because data from operational networks is the most
realistic but is considered confidential by most network operators (Orfila, Tapiador, &
Ribagorda, 2009). One approach to solving privacy issues is to use simulations, but these
can be unrealistic (Orfila et al., 2009). Another approach to solving privacy concerns is to
create datasets in test beds, but if they are too simple, they will lack realism as well
(Milenkoski, Vieira, Kounev, Avritzer, & Payne, 2015).
Another significant challenge in the creation of intrusion datasets is the labeling
of normal and attack data (Orfila et al., 2009). One approach to labeling attacks is to use
penetration testing to develop the attack data, but this has been criticized for producing
unrealistic datasets (Wheelus, Khoshgoftaar, Zuech, & Najafabadi, 2014; Milenkoski et
al., 2015). Another approach is to use honeypots for collection of attack data, but since
honeypots contain mostly attack data, this too can be considered unrealistic (Milenkoski
et al., 2015). Other approaches develop traces of normal network conditions and separate
traces of attacks (Salem, Reissmann, & Buehler, 2014). Still other approaches use
combinations of operational network data, penetration testing data, and simulation to
create a more diverse, complex dataset for intrusion detection testing (Shiravi, Shiravi,
Tavallaee, & Ghorbani, 2012; Moustafa & Slay, 2015; Singh, Kumar, & Singla, 2015;
Haider, Hu, Slay, Turnbull, & Xie, 2017).
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Other research on intrusion detection datasets includes methods and software
tools that aid in the creation of intrusion datasets. For example, Shiravi et al. (2012)
created software agents for generating normal network activity and attack activity in test
beds. Salem et al. (2014) developed the OptiFilter toolkit, which can be deployed in large
networks to create continuous datasets for intrusion detection evaluation.
Vasilomanolakis, Cordero, Milanov, and Mühlhäuser (2016) developed the ID2T toolkit
for injecting synthetic attacks into real network packet capture data. Lin, Lin, Wang,
Chen, and Lai (2016) developed PCAPLib to automatically extract, classify, and
anonymize packet capture data.

Review of Intrusion Detection Dataset Literature
The KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection dataset set a standard for many years for
evaluating intrusion detection approaches. The source data for this dataset came from
DARPA’s MIT Lincoln Labs collection of network packet information called IDEVAL
(Cao et al., 2013). The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was prepared by Stolfo, Fan, Lee,
Prodromidis, and Chan (2000) and was based upon the IDEVAL network packet data,
which contained seven weeks of network traffic. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was
specifically prepared for the KDD competition (Cao et al., 2013). The KDD Cup 1999
training dataset includes approximately 4.9 million connection records and is labeled as
either normal or with a specific attack vector (Tavallaee et al., 2009). The attacks in the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset fall into four categories: 1) denial of service attack, 2) user to root
attacks, 3) remote to local attacks, and 4) probing attacks (Tavallaee et al., 2009).
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Over time, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been criticized by researchers for three
primary reasons. First, the characteristics of networks have changed since KDD Cup
1999 was created (Qian et al., 2006). For example, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset was
collected on the Solaris operating system, used older applications and operating system
approaches, and represented a time when attacks generally were against only a single
system process at one time (Creech & Hu, 2013). Second, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset
contains 78% duplicate records in the training dataset and 75% duplication in the testing
dataset, which may lead to problems of overfitting (Tavallaee et al., 2009). Third, the
number of records in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset are too numerous, so many researchers
use only subsets of these datasets. This leads to an inconsistent basis for comparison
between intrusion detection systems (Tavallaee et al., 2009).
In response to the criticisms of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, a number of
researchers have proposed alternative datasets. Table 5 provides a summary of many
notable intrusion detection datasets that have been created as potential alternatives to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Most notable among these are Gure KDD Cup (Perona et al.
2008), NSL-KDD (Tavallaee et al., 2009), MAWILab (Fontugne, Borgnat, Abry,
Fukuda, 2010), ADFA-LD12 (Creech & Hu, 2013), UNSW-NB15 (Moustafa & Slay,
2015), and NGIDS-DS (Haider et al., 2017).
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Table 5
Summary of Intrusion Detection Dataset Research
Study
Stolfo et al.
(2000)

Data Type
Network
packet data

Approach
Extraction of features
from DARPA 1998
dataset

Contributions
Produced the KDD Cup
1999 dataset. Found that
fraud detection can be
generalized to intrusion
detection.

Qian et al., (2006)

Network
packets and
audit logs

Simulation based on
university laboratory
LAN

Feasibility of creating
synthetic IDS testing data.
Data is more useful at user
level than at packet level.

Perona et al.
(2008)

Network
packed data

Combined KDD Cup
1999 dataset with
DARPA 1998
payload data

Produced Gure KDD Cup
dataset. Including payload
and header data improves
detection.

Tavallaee et al.
(2009)

Network
and host
data

Subset of KDD-Cup
1999 dataset to
remove redundancy
and duplicates

Created NSL-KDD dataset,
which is an improved
distribution of data for IDS
testing. Still suffers from
unrealistic network data.

Fontugne et al.
(2010)

Network
data

Combined anomaly
detection results from
MAWI archive by
using SCANN

Created MAWILab dataset,
which is updated daily.
Labeled as Anomalous,
Suspicious, Notice, and
Benign.

Gogoi, Bhuyan,
Bhattacharyya, &
Kalita (2012)

Network
packet and
flow data

Captured from test
bed with over 350
nodes with automated
attacks

Produced TUIDS DDoS
dataset.

Shiravi et al.
(2012)

Network
packet data

Test bed with 21
workstations using α
and β profiles to
generate dynamic test
data

Established criteria for
evaluating datasets: realistic
network, realistic traffic,
labeled dataset, total
interaction capture, complete
capture, and diverse attacks.
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Table 5
Summary of Intrusion Detection Dataset Research (Cont.)
Study
Cao et al. (2013)

Data Type
Network
packet data

Approach
Test bed similar to
that used for DARPA
1998 data

Contributions
Produced LUT13 dataset.
Better in comparison to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset for
generalizable detection.

Creech & Hu
(2013)

Audit log
data

Single Ubuntu Linux
server with common
software applications
with normal and
attack traces

Produced ADFA-LD12
dataset. Evaluation shows
this dataset has more
complexity than KDD Cup
1999.

Wheelus et al.
(2014)

Network
packet and
flow data

Collected data from
internet service
provider and
manually labeled

Produced SANTA dataset,
which features realistic
normal traffic, penetration
testing traffic, real attacks,
and modern attack types.

Moustafa & Slay
(2015)

Network
packet data

Synthetic generation
using IXIA Perfect
Storm hardware

Produced synthetically
realistic, labeled dataset
called UNSW-NB15.

Singh et al. (2015) Network
and host
data

Statistical approach to Created Panjab University
generate a new dataset Intrusion Data Set (PU-IDS).
using NSL-KDD as a
base dataset

Haider et al.
(2017)

Synthetic generation
using IXIA Perfect
Storm hardware

Network
packet and
audit log
data

Produced synthetically
realistic, labeled dataset
called NGIDS-DS.
Developed evaluation
criteria for intrusion datasets.

Discussion
At present, there is not an accepted standard for evaluating the quality and
usefulness of intrusion detection datasets. Milenkoski et al. (2015) surveyed intrusion
detection research literature and developed a method of categorizing intrusion detection
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evaluation. Their work was inconclusive in offering a standard for evaluation, but it did
provide an overview of the complexities inherent in this area of research. Most recently,
Haider et al. (2017) developed evaluation criteria that consists of six factors: 1)
completeness of capture of audit logs and network packets, 2) inclusion of maximum
possible attacks, 3) representative of current attack behaviors, 4) inclusive of real world
normal traffic that includes realistic timing and complexity, 5) capture of system
maintenance activity that occurs in real operational networks, and 6) ground truth
labeling to represent normal traffic. Since it is a more recent study the Haider et al.
(2017) evaluation criteria may become an accepted standard, but this will require time
and a critical analysis by future researchers.
Since its inception, the UNSW-NB15 dataset has been gaining adoption from
researchers. It is commonly used alongside other datasets. For example, Bamakan, Wang,
and Shi (2017) applied both the UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD datasets to multi-class
intrusion detection using Ramp Loss K-Support Vector Classification-Regression.
Kamarudin, Maple, Watson, and Safa (2017) used both UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD to
test an ensemble classifier used for anomaly detection. Hajisalem and Babaie (2018) used
both the UNSW-NB15 and the NSL-KDD datasets to test a new hybrid intrusion
detection system using artificial bee colony and artificial fish swarm algorithms.
Papamartzivanos, Mármol, and Kambourakis (2018) used UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD, and
KDD Cup 1999 for rule induction for intrusion detection. With these recent studies in
mind, it has become an accepted practice to use both the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15
datasets to test intrusion detection algorithms.
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Summary
This chapter reviewed and synthesized relevant research in the areas of CSA,
intrusion detection, probabilistic intrusion detection, clustering ensembles, and intrusion
detection datasets. CSA uses observations of individual events in the broader context of
the situation at hand, with a goal of predicting future states. Intrusion detection is a
method for detecting attacks based upon either signatures of known attacks or the
identification of anomalies. Intrusion detection has contributed to the first level of CSA,
in that it provides individual events for evaluating the situation under conditions of
uncertainty. Probabilistic intrusion detection methods have been effective in intrusion
detection, which provides support for the approach in this research. Clustering ensembles
provide multiple perspectives of a dataset and are effective in detecting patterns and
anomalies in data without prior knowledge of the structures of the data.
In addition, this chapter provided a detailed overview of intrusion detection
datasets. It presented the challenges associated with selecting and generating such
datasets for research. Several criteria should be considered to ensure the suitability of
datasets for evaluating intrusion detection systems. Datasets should be complete and be
representative of current attack behaviors with suitable complexity to reflect operational
networks. Further, they should either be labeled with specific attack types or include a
ground truth labeling to separate normal from anomalous data. Using both the UNSWNB15 and NSL-KDD datasets to test intrusion detection systems has become a common
practice in research.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Introduction
This chapter describes the approach that was used for implementing and
evaluating the effectiveness of the experiments. This research used clustering ensembles,
bagging, probability analysis, and active learning. The result was the probability that a
computer system was being attacked, based on the event-level observation of anomalies
that were identified using clustering ensembles. The resulting solution not only provided
unsupervised intrusion detection but also, by incorporating active learning, allowed a
level of human interaction by subject matter experts with domain knowledge. This
solution evolved through three experimental stages.
In the first experiment, an algorithm for cluster generation with bagging was
developed. This experiment evaluated and compared different existing cluster generation
parameters to determine their suitability for deriving meaning from intrusion detection
datasets. The second experiment developed an algorithm for probabilistic anomaly
detection, using the clustering ensemble results. The third and final experiment
incorporated active learning to allow domain knowledge from subject matter experts.
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Solution Design
A multi-stage algorithm was developed that generated a diverse set of initial
partitions, evaluated the results of the initial clustering to detect anomalies, and processed
the output, while incorporating subject matter expert feedback. Figure 5 summarizes the
high-level design of the solution and includes important design considerations that are
described in more detail in this chapter.

Figure 5. High level solution design

Dataset
The selection of a dataset for evaluating intrusion detection systems is important
for allowing algorithms and approaches to be compared to each other (Milenkoski et al.,
2015). Prior research has found that intrusion detection datasets should be realistic,
publicly available, and provide ground truth data (Shiravi et al., 2012; Haider et al.,
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2017). For this research, it was also important that the dataset identified the specific
computer systems that were experiencing normal or attack activity.
Two datasets were used in evaluating this solution. First, the NSL-KDD dataset
was used as a general dataset that connected this research with prior studies. Although
this dataset is outdated, it provided a basis of comparison with a dataset that lacks the
complexity of more contemporary intrusion datasets. Since the NSL-KDD dataset does
not identify specific computer systems, it could only be used to evaluate the clustering
ensemble approaches and preliminary anomaly detection at the event level. It was not
used to evaluate the probability that a specific computer system was being attacked.
The second dataset that was be used throughout this research was the UNSWNB15 dataset, which was created by Moustafa and Slay (2015). One of the most
important features of the UNSW-NB15 dataset was that it identified specific computer
systems with a source IP address and a destination IP address. This allowed the
evaluation of the probability that a specific computer system was under attack. This
dataset is more current than the NSL-KDD dataset, and so it reflects more current attacks.
It is also a more complex dataset for intrusion detection, which means that it is more
difficult to detect attacks, and better tested the capabilities of the algorithm.

Cluster Generation with Bagging
The cluster generation stage of the solution was evaluated using a variety of
criteria. First, an appropriate clustering algorithm was needed that had reasonable
computational complexity and that was well-suited for the dataset. It was expected that kmeans clustering would be suitable for this clustering. The need for diversity in the
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clustering results was accomplished using bagging, which selected random features from
the dataset to provide diversity. As a result, it was not expected that this solution would
require diverse algorithms.
Another important criteria in developing the cluster generation stage was the
number of partitions to generate. Previous studies found that sufficient partitions are
needed to provide diversity, but they also found that a medium diversity approach
performed better than a larger diversity solution (Azimi & Fern, 2009). This was
important for evaluation to identify the number of clusters that provide the optimal
diversity.

Anomaly Detection
The anomaly detection stage contained two important algorithms. The first
algorithm evaluated the clustering ensemble results to find anomalies. This algorithm
differed from other clustering ensemble approaches in that its objective was not to find
common clusters, but instead to find the anomalies. This overcame the clustering
correlation problem, which arises from the lack of labels, thus simplifying the problem of
cluster evaluation.
This algorithm first evaluated each partition to determine which clustering labels
represented anomalies. To accomplish this, the algorithm used counting and statistical
analysis of the clusters to determine which of the clusters in the partition were
inconsistent with the others. It was expected that anomalous clusters could be detected as
follows:
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0,
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {
1,

𝜇𝑐 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ≤ |𝐶𝑖 | ≤ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
(|𝐶𝑖 | < 𝜇𝐶 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ) ∪ (|𝐶𝑖 | > 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶 )

(4)

In this case, |𝐶𝑖 | is the number of events identified in cluster, 𝐶𝑖 . This number of
records was compared to the mean of the number of events in all of the clusters, 𝜇𝐶 ,
minus a constant, K, number of standard deviations, 𝜎𝐶 . Thus, a cluster would be
considered an anomaly when the number of records in it is outside of the interval of
𝐾standard deviations from the mean number of records in each cluster. The value for
𝐾was determined experimentally to find an appropriate threshold. This algorithm was
tested and updated based on observations in the data.
Next, the algorithm evaluated each event, E, in the dataset to determine the
probability that the event was an anomaly, P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 ). This evaluation would be based
on the number of clusters to which it was assigned that were considered anomalies
divided by the total number of clusters. It was expected that event-level anomalies could
be detected as:
𝑛

1
P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 ) = ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦
𝑛

(5)

𝑖=1

The result, P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 ), represents the probability that an event is an anomaly,
based on the number of partitions that found it was an anomaly. If this probability needed
to be converted into a binary result, a threshold probability would be selected to
determine when the probability represents an anomaly. Instead, the probability was
preserved as a soft metric and was passed to the second algorithm. This algorithm also
was tested and updated based on observations in the data.
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The second algorithm in the anomaly detection stage determined the probability
that a computer system was being attacked, based on the observation of one or more
anomalies. Given the probability that a computer system was being attacked as P(A) and
the probability that an individual event is an anomaly, P(E), this solution assumed that
prior to any observations, the probability that a computer was under attack would be
uncertain, thus:
P(𝐴) = 0.5

(6)

Further, given the initial probability that the computer system was under attack
and an observation of an anomalous event, the probability of an event being an attack,
given that a computer system being attacked, would be:

P(𝐸 |𝐴) = P(𝐴) × P(𝐸)

(7)

Following the observation of an event, it would be reasonable to update the prior
probability to reflect the greater certainty, based on the probability of the observation.
Therefore, given a number of observations, N, it was expected that the probability that a
computer system is being attacked would be:

𝑁

1
P(𝐴) = P(𝐴) + ∑ P(𝐸𝑖 |𝐴) − 0.5
𝑁
𝑖=1

(8)
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The probability portion of the algorithm was developed based on these
assumptions and was modified, as needed, through evaluation of the experimental results.

Active Learning
The active learning portion of this solution was built upon previous approaches
developed by McElwee (2017). Active learning is successful in separating normal from
attack traffic using minimal labeling (McElwee, 2017). Areas for improvement include
more detailed evaluation of the sampling, as well as the use of an improved oracle that
allows the detection of certain rare attacks (McElwee, 2017).
In addition to sampling the events to be sent to the oracle for labeling, this stage
of the algorithm determined how to use this feedback to influence the outcome of the
anomaly detection. The two most likely opportunities evaluated were to override the
probability that an event was indeed anomalous, P(E), or to use the oracle’s response to
update the prior probability that the computer system was under attack, P(A). The
approach for active learning was finalized during the implementation and testing of the
third experiment.

Experiment 1: Cluster Generation
The first experiment evaluated cluster generation strategies. This experiment
focused on the k-means clustering algorithm and used bagging to generate a variety of
clustering results. This experiment first required the implementation of a cluster
generation algorithm that was configurable for a number of parameters. The k-means
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clustering algorithm was used for this experiment, since it is a widely accepted algorithm
that produces hyperspherical clusters with a relatively low computational complexity.
This experiment determined the number of partitions, ℙ, to generate, such that the
partitions were a subset of all possible partitions, ℙ ∈ ℙ𝐾 . A partition is a result from a
clustering solution that contains one or more clusters, 𝑃𝑁 ∈ ℙ, such that 𝑃𝑁 =
{𝐶1 , 𝐶2 , 𝐶3 , … 𝐶𝑘 }. As a result, there were a configurable number of partitions in ℙ.
By implementing bagging, each partition had a pseudorandom number of clusters
that were generated and were based on a pseudorandom number of features. The result
was a diverse set of features, a diverse set of partitions with different clustering results,
and a generalizable clustering solution. Using bagging helped to prevent the problem of
overfitting.

Experimental Design
The algorithm that was used to implement the cluster generation is shown in
Figure 6. After predetermining the number of partitions, N, to generate, this algorithm
created a sampling plan that was based upon the number of features provided in the
dataset. For each partition, the sampling plan included a selection of features to use from
the dataset. The values that were selected in the sampling plan were determined
experimentally, with the objective of optimizing the clustering results while minimizing
computational complexity.
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Figure 6. Algorithm for cluster generation

Following the sampling plan, the algorithm generated N partitions using the kmeans clustering algorithm. The partitions were stored in a data structure that was used in
subsequent stages of the intrusion detection solution, but this data was also available for
export to a CSV file for off-line analysis. An evaluation step was included in this
algorithm, since it is expected that some of the pseudorandom clustering solutions
defined in the sampling plan would not cluster well and could be discarded immediately.

Evaluation
The results of this experiment were analyzed using statistical frequency analysis
of a variety of experimental runs. The focus of this experiment was to determine the
optimal settings for cluster generation before moving on to the next experiment.
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Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection
The second experiment focused on two algorithms. First, it implemented and
evaluated the effectiveness of using the cluster generation results to identify anomalous
events. Second, it implemented and evaluated the probability that a computer host was
being attacked.

Experimental Design
Figure 7 shows an overview of the algorithm that was developed for this
experiment. The input to this algorithm was the set of partitions that were developed in
the first experiment. For each partition in the set, the algorithm determined if each cluster
in the partition was an anomaly. From this a probability was calculated to determine if an
event represented an attack, P(E). After computing P(E) for each event, these
probabilities were used to update a list of each computer system to reflect the probability
that the computer system was being attacked, P(A).
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Figure 7. Algorithm for probabilistic anomaly detection

It was expected that the computational complexity would be approximately
O(2n), where n is the number of events in the dataset. It was also expected that the
computational complexity of cluster anomaly evaluation would be negligible, since it was
limited by the number of partitions. Further, it was expected that the loop through each
event would have a linear computation requirement and would thus be O(n). The
evaluation to determine if a computer system was compromised would be limited to the
number of computer systems times the average number of events per computer system,
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which should be approximately O(n). This appears to be reasonable for large intrusion
datasets and this was evaluated as part of this experiment.

Evaluation
The results of this experiment were evaluated for accuracy compared to the
ground truth data provided with the datasets. For the NSL-KDD dataset, this experiment
only evaluated the accuracy of the anomaly detection at the event level, since individual
computer systems were not identified in this dataset. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, this
experiment evaluated both the accuracy of the anomaly detection and threshold at which
a computer system’s probability of attack was reasonable.
To evaluate the accuracy of the probability that an event is anomalous, it was
expected that a threshold probability would be selected to represent an event as an attack.
Then the accuracy and error rates would be calculated as:

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦

(9)

(10)

To evaluate the probability that a computer system was being attacked, it was
expected that subsets of the data would need to be presented to the algorithm to create a
variety of scenarios to simulate targeted attacks against a reduced number of computer
systems; however, after analysis of the datasets, the entire dataset was presented to the
algorithm. The evaluation included the numbers of normal and attack records injected
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into the algorithm along with a comparison of the probabilities of a computer system
being attacked.

Experiment 3: Active Learning
The third experiment incorporated active learning into the overall solution. In this
context, active learning was implemented to sample certain unlabeled data that would be
sent to the oracle. An oracle is an entity that knows what the correct label is for the data
and represents a human subject matter expert. The objective was to minimize the amount
of data that needed to be sent to the oracle while ensuring that sufficient labels were
provided to improve the overall machine learning output. Since this experiment included
datasets that had ground truth data to distinguish between attacks and normal events, the
oracle was created programmatically, rather than relying on a human subject matter
expert.
The queries to the oracle were used to determine if an event was an attack or
normal, as well as to determine if the probability that a computer system being attacked
was correct. Thus, the oracle stored ground truth information for both types of events.
The specific events and computer systems that were presented to the oracle were based
on a sampling strategy that was built upon prior research (McElwee, 2017). The results
were compared to arrive at a recommended sampling approach.
The incorporation of the feedback into the probabilistic anomaly detection portion
of the solution was determined after the second experiment had been completed. It was
expected that the results of the active learning would be used to update P(E) prior to
updating P(A) for a computer system. It was also expected that the active learning results
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could also update P(A) directly, based on feedback that a computer system was not being
attacked.

Evaluation
The accuracy results from Experiment 2 were used as a basis of comparison for
this experiment. The objective was to improve the accuracy of the overall solution by
incorporating domain knowledge from subject matter experts, as represented by the
oracle. In addition, this experiment evaluated the accuracy compared to the number of
requests sent to the oracle, since it was obvious that if all events and computer systemlevel decisions were sent to the oracle, then 100% accuracy could have been achieved.
Thus, it was expected that there would be a sigmoid curve when the accuracy was plotted
against the number of requests sent to the oracle.

Resource Requirements
This research had three primary resource requirements. First, datasets for
intrusion detection were required as the input. This research did not create a new
intrusion detection dataset, but rather relied upon existing, publicly available datasets. As
mentioned previously, the two datasets that were used for this research were the NSLKDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets.
The second resource requirement was a development environment, including
computing hardware, programming languages, and libraries for data handling and
machine learning. The development environment consisted of a laptop computer running
Microsoft Windows 10. The intrusion detection system and algorithms were developed
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using Python and the PyCharm integrated development environment. Programming
libraries that were implemented in this research included scikit-learn machine learning
algorithms and pandas DataFrames. TensorFlow was considered for its deferred
processing capabilities and its ability to use GPU processing, but it was not used in this
research.
The third resource requirement was an environment for processing the data using
the algorithms that had been developed. Most of these algorithms performed satisfactorily
in the development environment, but cloud computing services were used to provide
additional processing capabilities that reduced the computation time for cluster
generation.

Summary
This chapter introduced the approach for probabilistic clustering ensembles with
active learning for intrusion detection. It provided a high-level overview of the solution
and the algorithms, as well as details regarding the datasets that were used. This chapter
included the approach that was used for cluster generation and the method for
probabilistic anomaly detection. This chapter also provided an overview of how active
learning would be applied after the probabilistic anomaly detection function was
finalized.
This chapter described the testing and evaluation approaches that were used
through a series of three experiments. The first experiment focused on cluster generation
to evaluate the optimal way to generate diverse clustering solutions that were used later
for anomaly detection. The second experiment focused on probabilistic anomaly
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detection by applying probabilistic reasoning to the observation of events, leading to the
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Finally, the third experiment
enhanced the solution with active learning approaches and compared the accuracy to that
of the probabilistic anomaly detection experiment.

75

Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
This chapter describes the implementation and results of the three experiments
conducted in this research. It details the design and implementation of the algorithms by
using a class diagram and a description of the classes. Next, this chapter describes the
selected datasets and preprocessing.
This chapter presents the design of each experiment as well as the evaluation
approach, observations, and preliminary conclusions. The first experiment implemented
and evaluated cluster generation, and the results, which were surprising, were
foundational to the remainder of the experiments. The second experiment implemented
the anomaly detection algorithm and evaluated the use of the partitions of clustering
results to find both the probability that an event was an anomaly, P(E), and the
probability that a computer system was under attack, P(A). Once again, the results were
different than expected, but demonstrated the success of the algorithm. Finally, the third
experiment implemented active learning to update P(A) by correctly labeling a sampling
of events for the computer systems that were found to have anomalies. The result was
that false positives were eliminated after updating the labels of a small number of events.
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Experiment Design and Implementation
The experiments implemented the algorithms defined in Figures 6 and 7 in
Chapter 3, Methodology. The experiments were implemented using object-oriented
design with Python 2.7 using custom classes. In addition, existing libraries were used,
such as pandas and scikit-learn. Figure 8 illustrates the class diagram that was used for
the experiments.

Figure 8. Class diagram

CEPIDS Class
The class name, CEPIDS, is the acronym for Clustering Ensemble Probabilistic
Intrusion Detection System. This class is responsible for the high-level execution of the
algorithm, the calculation of P(E) for events, the calculation of P(A) for computer
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systems, and for implementing the active learning. It contains a main() function that
allows it to be executed directly for complete execution of cluster generation,
probabilistic anomaly detection, and active learning. The main() function orchestrates the
experiments. The CEPIDS class instantiates objects from the subsequent classes,
NSLKDD, UNSW, and PartitionGenerator.

NSLKDD and UNSW Classes
The NSLKDD and UNSW classes allowed their representative datasets to be
loaded from a file and preprocessed. After loading and preprocessing the datasets, these
classes could return a DataFrame that represented the full dataset, a list of features, or a
list of labels to allow for post processing and evaluation. Although these two datasets
have different sets of features, using the same functions in each class allowed the
implementation of each dataset to be abstracted and allowed the classes to be used
interchangeably in the CEPIDS class. As a result, these experiments can be extended to
other datasets by implementing the specific details of the dataset in a new dataset class
without modifying the logic of the algorithms. The NSLKDD and UNSW classes were
implemented in a single Python package, called datasets.py, which contained global
functions for preprocessing, such as filling in missing data values, encoding categorical
features, and scaling values to a range.
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PartitionGenerator Class
The PartitionGenerator class implemented the cluster generation. The
initialization of this class required an instantiated dataset object, which could be either of
the NSLKDD or UNSW classes. The class initialization also included configurable
parameters for selecting the number of partitions to generate, the minimum and
maximum ratio of features to include in generating the partitions, as well as the minimum
and maximum number of clusters to generate in each partition. Using the upper and lower
bounds of features and the number of clusters, the initialization of this class selected
pseudorandom numbers within those bounds. After the initialization was completed, the
cluster labels were retrieved using the get_labels() function, which returned a list of
numeric cluster labels for each partition. Each list of cluster labels followed the order of
the original dataset, which allowed them to be joined directly with the original dataset as
new features.

Development Environment
The development environment for the experiments in this research used PyCharm
for Python development. Source code was controlled in a private github repository. Most
experiments were conducted on a Lenovo laptop with an Intel Core i7 CPU running at 2.1
GHz, with 8 GB of memory, and with the Windows 10 operating system. Cluster
generation was found to be the most computationally complex problem, so to generate
sufficient numbers of clustering ensemble results for validation, Amazon EC2 instances
were also used. These instances were optimized for computational work, with 3 GHz,
Intel Xeon Platinum CPUs and 8 GB of memory. The EC2 instances allowed 10
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simultaneous executions of the cluster generation, with 100 partitions per execution. This
reduced the time to generate 10 sets of partitions to the same time it took to produce a
single set.

Input Dataset Analysis and Preparation
The first step in conducting the experiments was to evaluate the datasets and
preprocessing requirements that were needed. This preparation work was performed
using Microsoft Excel pivot tables. This allowed various ways of examining the datasets
to understand their characteristics.

NSL-KDD
NSL-KDD was one of the datasets used for this research. The NSL-KDD dataset
is a subset of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset that eliminates duplication. An analysis of the
composition of the NSL-KDD training dataset found that it contained only 53% normal
records. An important assumption of this research is that network events are highly
imbalanced, with a predominant number of normal records and a very small number of
attack records. Since nearly half of this dataset contained attacks, it could not be
considered as representative of normal network conditions, which might only contain a
very small percentage of attacks. To compensate for this even distribution of normal and
attack records, a derived dataset was prepared that contained a subset of the events from
the NSL-KDD dataset. By eliminating the denial of service records, the resulting dataset
contained 98% normal records and was more representative of a realistic network that
was experiencing targeted attacks. All subsequent experiments using the NSL-KDD
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dataset used this derived dataset. Table 6 shows the distribution of classes in both the
original and the derived datasets.

Table 6
Original and Derived NSL-KDD Dataset Label Distributions
Original Dataset
Label

Derived Dataset
Records

% Total

Label

Records

% Total

Normal

67,343

53%

normal

67,343

98%

neptune

41,214

33%

warezclient

890

1%

Satan

3,633

3%

guess_passwd

53

0%

ipsweep

3,599

3%

buffer_overflow

30

0%

portsweep

2,931

2%

warezmaster

20

0%

Smurf

2,646

2%

land

18

0%

Nmap

1,493

1%

imap

11

0%

Back

956

1%

rootkit

10

0%

teardrop

892

1%

loadmodule

9

0%

warezclient

890

1%

ftp_write

8

0%

Pod

201

0%

multihop

7

0%

guess_passwd

53

0%

phf

4

0%

buffer_overflow

30

0%

perl

3

0%

warezmaster

20

0%

spy

2

0%

Land

18

0%

Total

68,408

100%

Imap

11

0%

Rootkit

10

0%

loadmodule

9

0%

ftp_write

8

0%

multihop

7

0%

Phf

4

0%

Perl

3

0%

Spy

2

0%

125,973

100%

Total
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UNSW-NB15
The UNSW-NB15 dataset includes a variety of files. First, this dataset includes
full packet capture data that was the source data for all subsequent files generated for this
dataset. Next, it includes a training and testing dataset that was created using the packet
capture data and is well-suited for machine learning. This data is similar in composition
to the NSL-KDD dataset in that it does not include computer system identifiers, such as
IP addresses. As a result, these files were not useful for this research. The UNSW-NB15
dataset includes four comma separated value files that were generated from the packet
capture data using Argus, Bro, and customized algorithms. These files each represent
network connection events that include source and destination IP addresses for each
event. It is this set of data that was used for this research, since it included the classes of
the events and uniquely identified the source destination IP addresses. The classes of
events in this dataset consisted of: Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic,
Reconnaissance, Shellcode, Worms, and Normal.
The experiments used one of the four files, UNSW-NB15_1.csv, which contained
700,001 events, 44 unique destination IP addresses, and 40 unique source IP addresses. It
was representative of the other datasets. This file was highly imbalanced, consisting of
97% normal records. As a result, no modifications or derived datasets were needed. Table
7 shows the distribution of classes in this dataset.
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Table 7
UNSW-NB15_1 Dataset Label Distributions
Label

Records

PctTotal

Normal

677,786

96.8%

Generic

7,522

1.1%

Exploits

5,409

0.8%

Fuzzers

5,051

0.7%

Reconnaissance

1,759

0.3%

DoS

1,167

0.2%

Backdoors

534

0.1%

Analysis

526

0.1%

Shellcode

223

0.0%

24

0.0%

700,001

100%

Worms
Total

Experiment 1: Cluster Generation
Design
The purpose of the first experiment was to build a foundation of cluster
generation that could be used in subsequent experiments. All clustering performed in this
experiment used the k-means clustering algorithm. It was important to ensure that each of
the partitions of clustering results was diverse, so that the resulting partitions represented
multiple perspectives of the data groupings. To generate diverse clusters, this experiment
began with a bagging plan that included a pseudorandom set of features and a
pseudorandom number of clusters per partition. As a result, each partition was built using
a different number of features from the original dataset, and those features were randomly
selected. Each partition also had a different number of clusters.
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To select the features to be used in each partition, this experiment was constructed
to be generalizable to other datasets. As a result, the bagging plan included a maximum
of 75% of the available features from the original dataset, and a lower limit of 25%. For
example, the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains 49 features, including a label and an attack
category. Since the label and the attack category represent the class of each event, this
dataset has 47 features that are useful for clustering. Thus, the number of features that
were clustered in each of the partitions generated for the UNSW-NB15 dataset ranged
from 12 to 35.
To select the number of clusters to generate for each partition, this experiment
included parameters for the minimum and maximum number of clusters to generate.
Initial experiments used low numbers of clusters, such as a minimum of four and a
maximum of 20. The results were analyzed using Microsoft Excel pivot tables, and the
result was that each cluster had a predominantly high number of normal records. The
ranges were expanded until a more reasonable distribution of normal records was
identified. The final range for the number of clusters in each partition was a minimum of
40 and a maximum of 100. Increasing the upper limit further may have improved the
distribution of events in each cluster, but higher numbers of clusters required more
computational processing time, so a maximum of 100 was selected as a trade-off between
performance and diversity. Prior research showed that ensembles of weak clusterers were
better than single clustering algorithms, so it was expected that any limitations of cluster
generation would be offset in the cluster evaluation stage (Topchy et al., 2005).
The first experiment produced a DataFrame and an output file that were used for
the evaluation of the results as well as for the input to the second experiment. Each
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partition that was generated was represented as a feature appended to the original dataset.
Each partition was assigned a feature name that began with the letter P and was followed
by the partition number, such as P0 through P99. The values that were populated in the
partitions were integers that represented the clustering labels for each partition. Initial
experiments began with as few as 10 partitions and went as high as 100 partitions to
provide a diverse set of clustering solutions for the second experiment.

Analysis
The most important analysis in this first experiment was to determine if there was
a clustering generation strategy that would allow anomalies to be detected according to
the formula:
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {

0,
1,

𝜇𝑐 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ≤ |𝐶𝑖 | ≤ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
(|𝐶𝑖 | < 𝜇𝐶 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ) ∪ (|𝐶𝑖 | > 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶 )

(11)

Using this formula, normal clusters were defined by counting the number of
records in each cluster, |Ci|, and determining if it was within K standard deviations of the
mean number of events in each cluster. Anomalies were defined by evaluating if the
count of records in each cluster was outside of the range of normal events.
The cluster generation performed in this experiment began with the NSL-KDD
dataset because of its smaller size and lower computational resource requirements. The
output file from this experiment was imported into Microsoft Excel and was analyzed
using pivot tables. This analysis isolated a sample partition, calculated the mean number
of records per cluster, calculated the standard deviation of the number of records per
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cluster, and calculated a variable number of standard deviations above and below the
mean.
This experiment found that the results of the clustering ensembles were not
distributed as originally expected. Instead, clusters with the highest numbers of records
predominantly had 100% normal classes. Clusters with the least number of records had a
mixture of normal and anomalous classes, but none of these clusters could be identified
as exclusively anomalous. Table 8 shows an example of what was found for a sample
partition in one of the tests. In this test, the partition had 13 clusters, labeled from 0 to 12.
Using the total record count for each cluster, two standard deviations above the mean was
14,944. The only cluster that had more records than this threshold was cluster 6, which
had 14,974 records. Cluster 6 consisted exclusively of normal records. It is also important
to note that two standard deviations below the mean was -4,420, making it impossible for
any clusters to have a number of records below this threshold.

Table 8
Distribution of Attack and Normal Records in Sample Partition
Label
6
8
2
1
4
5
3
7
9
12
0
10
11

Attack
0
4
0
0
582
44
79
4
0
0
311
12
29

Normal
14,974
14,466
8,704
6,668
5,234
4,534
3,555
2,705
2,337
2,087
821
845
413

Total
14,974
14,470
8,704
6,668
5,816
4,578
3,634
2,709
2,337
2,087
1,132
857
442
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After observing this distribution in the sample of partitions, this experiment
implemented a Python function that generated the pivot tables for all partitions generated
using the NSL-KDD dataset. The result was consistent across approximately 99% of the
partitions. Exploring this observation further, the function was applied to the UNSWNB15 dataset and found that clusters with a number of records above the threshold were
consistently normal classes with a high degree of accuracy. As a result, this experiment
modified the original assumption by finding that:
0,
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {
< 0.5,

|𝐶𝑖 | ≥ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
|𝐶𝑖 | < 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶

(12)

This updated function resulted in a high degree of certainty of what was normal
when two standard deviations was selected for K. For clusters with less than this
threshold number of events, there was uncertainty, which is reflected as a probability of
0.5 or less that an event is anomalous. It was expected that a higher number of standard
deviations above the mean would result in a more accurate prediction of normal events,
but this resulted in less records that met the criteria and did not improve the accuracy.
After evaluating the clustering results using ranges of K standard deviations from 1.5 to
4, this experiment found that 2 standard deviations performed consistently well in
identifying the normal classes.

Computational Efficiency
Cluster generation was the most computationally expensive algorithm of the
experiments. Although this was not a significant problem for the NSL-KDD dataset,
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because of the lower number of records, it was a problem for the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
When this experiment used a maximum number of 20 clusters per partition, the cluster
generation was relatively quick; however, to obtain a more diverse set of clusters, a
maximum of 100 cluster centers per partition was selected. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset,
to generate 100 partitions with up to 100 clusters per partition, the algorithm took
approximately 12 hours to complete.
The computational complexity for the scikit-learn implementation of k-means
clustering is O(knT), where k is the number of clusters, n is the number of samples, and T
is the number of iterations. This was prohibitive, since all 700,001 samples in the
UNSW-NB15 dataset were used, and since the maximum number of clusters per partition
was as high as 100. In addition, a maximum of 300 iterations was selected for the kmeans clustering algorithm, which was time consuming to run as many as 100 partitions
per cluster generation run.
The generation of partitions can be scaled by running the algorithm in parallel.
This experiment overcame some of the computational complexity by submitting the input
dataset to the same algorithm running on multiple servers. This allowed the generation of
the multiple sets of partitions needed for this research to be created in the same time it
took to create a single set of partitions.

Observations
This experiment created a diverse set of partitions using the k-means clustering
algorithm to generate a range of clusters per partition from 40 to 100 for the NSL-KDD
and UNSW-NB15 datasets. It also found that a random bagging plan that ranged from
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25% to 75% of available features was effective in generating diverse partitions. Most
importantly, this experiment found that the distribution of clustering results by counting
the events in each cluster did not clearly identify anomalous events, but rather could be
used accurately to identify certain normal records. The result of this experiment indicated
that P(E) for each event was not a hard probability but rather was a soft belief that could
be used as an observation for updating P(A|E). The observations from this experiment
were carried forward into the second experiment to determine if the results could be used
for anomaly detection.

Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection
This experiment consisted of two algorithms. Beginning with the partitions
generated in the first experiment, this algorithm first calculated the probability that an
event was an anomaly, P(E). As found in the first experiment, this turned out to be a
belief that had more accuracy for normal events than for anomalies. The second
algorithm used P(E) to predict the probability that a computer system was experiencing a
cyberattack, P(A).

Design of P(E) Calculation
Using the proposed algorithm from the methodology section, it was expected that
in this experiment, P(E) would be calculated as the average of the anomalous clusters:
𝑛

1
P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 ) = ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦
𝑛

(13)

𝑖=1

In the first experiment, this research found that it was more predictive to look at
which clusters contained normal records rather than which clusters contained anomalies.
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To evaluate this algorithm and update this formula, this experiment used Microsoft Excel
pivot tables to find the number of partitions that classified each event as normal. Figure 9
illustrates the distribution of the event-level classes according to the number of votes that
a set of 100 partitions generated using the NSL-KDD dataset. In this graph, 100
represents all the partitions voting that the event was normal and 0 represented no votes
that the event was normal. The normal and attack classes are shown on different axes
and at different scales because of the imbalanced nature of the dataset. It is important to
note in this graph that above the midpoint number of votes, which was 50, this approach
demonstrated high accuracy for detecting normal events.

Figure 9. Graph of votes for NSL-KDD dataset
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A different pattern was found when evaluating the partitions generated using the
UNSW-NB15 dataset with 100 partitions. Figure 10 shows the distribution of events
compared to the number of votes. An interesting observation with this dataset was that
there were no instances where all the partitions voted that an event was normal. The
highest number of votes was 42. The pattern looked smoother, with less but more
pronounced peaks. Despite the differences with the NSL-KDD dataset, it still held that
above the midpoint number of votes, which was 21, this number of votes was still an
accurate method for detecting normal events with a high degree of accuracy.

Figure 10. Graph of votes for UNSW-NB15 dataset

Since this evaluation found that P(E) was certain for highly normal clusters and
uncertain for others, the calculation of P(E) was updated to assign a belief ranging from
0, for normal clusters, to 0.5, for uncertain clusters. To calculate P(E), this experiment
first evaluated Canomaly using two standard deviations as the threshold. Then using voting,
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for each event, this experiment counted the number of partitions that indicated the event
was normal. At this point, it was found that all events, with a few exceptions, were
normal when the number of normal votes ranged from the maximum of votes to half of
the maximum of votes. Thus, the algorithm was developed to assign P(E) = 0 for events
in this upper half of the votes. Below this range, the algorithm scaled P(E) to range from
0, for the most votes below the midpoint, to 0.5, for events with the least number of
votes.

𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 =

max(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠)
2

0,
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸
𝑃(𝐸) = {(1 − 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 )
,
2

(14)

𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
(15)
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸 < 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡

Analysis of P(E) Calculation
The accuracy of P(E) was calculated for events that fell above the midpoint of the
maximum votes, since below the midpoint P(E) was found to represent only a level of
uncertainty. Below this threshold, events were assigned a belief, which was suggestive
that there may have been anomalies, but did not reflect an accurate prediction of which
events are anomalies. Thus, for events above the midpoint, there were no true positives
and no false positives, since above this threshold, only true negative and false negative
results were expected:
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

=

0 + 𝑇𝑁
0 + 0 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

=

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

(16)

For the NSL-KDD dataset, the accuracy of P(E) above the midpoint was found to
be:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
=

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
27,394
27,394 + 3

(17)

= 0.999890

For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the accuracy of P(E) above the midpoint was found
to be:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
=

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
129,508
2129,508 + 6

(18)

= 0.999954

Although P(E) was not highly predictive of anomalies, it was highly predictive of
normal events. Thus, for determining that a computer system was under attack, P(A), this
experiment proceeded to determine if the accumulation of uncertainty was predictive that
a computer system was being attacked.
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Design of P(A) Calculation
After calculating P(E) for each event, this experiment then calculated P(A) as the
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Through experimentation, it was
found that calculating P(A) could be reduced to:
𝑁

1
P(𝐴) = ∑ P(𝐸𝑁 )
𝑁

(19)

𝑖=1

In this formula, P(A) is the probability that a computer system is experiencing an
attack, and N is the number of events attributable to each computer system. Thus, P(A)
represents the mean of P(E) when grouped by the computer system.
In calculating P(A) it was necessary to evaluate both computer systems involved
in each event, the source IP address (srcip) and the destination IP address (dstip). Using
the UNSW-NB15 dataset, it was not clear which of these two addresses represented the
attacker or the target of the attack, so it was important to consider both addresses in
calculating P(A).

Analysis of P(A) Calculation
Results varied when calculating P(A) for these two different IP addresses in each
event. Experimentation found that to calculate P(A) for the srcip, it was more effective to
group the events using a combination of srcip and dstip and to calculate the average P(E)
for each pair. Further grouping the resulting dataset on just the srcip, the result was that
for P(A) ≥ 0.8, the srcip addresses involved in attacks were consistently predicted with
100% accuracy. For the dstip address, using just the average P(E) allowed the dstip
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addresses to be identified for P(A) ≥ 0.8; however, there were some false positives of
dstip addresses that were identified but were not involved in attacks. The inaccurate
classifications were generally for destination IP addresses that had few events, which
made them appear to be anomalies when compared to the entire dataset. Table 9 shows
the results for a sample run including both the srcip and the dstip. The IP addresses that
have P(A) ≥ 0.8 are shown in bold. The Result column indicates if the result was a true
positive (TP), false positive (FP), or true negative (TN). There were no false negatives.

Table 9
Prediction of P(A) by srcip and dstip
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.6

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.920
0.907
0.842
0.622
0.621
0.619
0.609
0.608
0.608
0.604
0.601
0.600
0.597
0.465
0.462
0.459
0.459
0.440
0.420
0.412
0.409

dstip
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.17
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.18
10.40.170.2
32.50.32.66
10.40.182.3
10.40.85.30
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.2
224.0.0.5
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.7

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.997
0.996
0.993
0.992
0.988
0.987
0.977
0.963
0.920
0.903
0.887
0.861
0.784
0.656
0.616
0.607
0.599
0.597
0.596
0.591
0.589
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Table 9
Prediction of P(A) by srcip and dstip (cont.)
srcip
Result
59.166.0.5
TN
59.166.0.2
TN
10.40.85.1
TN
149.171.126.18
TN
149.171.126.15
TN
10.40.182.1
TN
149.171.126.10
TN
149.171.126.19
TN
149.171.126.11
TN
149.171.126.16
TN
10.40.170.2
TN
10.40.182.3
TN
149.171.126.13
TN
149.171.126.12
TN
10.40.85.30
TN
192.168.241.243
TN
127.0.0.1
TN
149.171.126.17
TN

P(A)
0.389
0.376
0.231
0.174
0.169
0.160
0.158
0.110
0.090
0.086
0.078
0.078
0.066
0.061
0.056
0.053
0.026
0.022

dstip
Result
59.166.0.0
TN
59.166.0.3
TN
59.166.0.4
TN
59.166.0.5
TN
175.45.176.1
TN
10.40.85.1
TN
175.45.176.2
TN
192.168.241.243
TN
149.171.126.1
TN
149.171.126.5
TN
175.45.176.0
TN
149.171.126.0
TN
149.171.126.7
TN
149.171.126.6
TN
149.171.126.8
TN
149.171.126.9
TN
175.45.176.3
TN
149.171.126.3
TN
149.171.126.2
TN
149.171.126.4
TN
10.40.198.10
TN
127.0.0.1
TN

P(A)
0.587
0.583
0.582
0.564
0.525
0.513
0.509
0.449
0.343
0.339
0.312
0.305
0.301
0.294
0.293
0.273
0.262
0.231
0.228
0.225
0.137
0.000

To ensure that the results were consistent, this experiment included ten runs of the
algorithm, using a different set of randomly generated partitions for each run. Table 9
shows the accuracy of calculating P(A) for the srcip and dstip. As Table 10 demonstrates,
the results were reproduceable for each of the runs. Thus, the algorithm did not require a
specific set of features or feature engineering to be successful, since the random partitions
of clusters proved to be successful for all runs.
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Table 10
P(A) Accuracy for Ten Runs
srcip

dstip

Run #

TP

TN

FP

FN

Accur.

TP

TN

FP

FN

Accur.

1

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

28

6

0

0.86

2

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

27

7

0

0.84

3

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

26

8

0

0.82

4

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

31

3

0

0.93

5

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

31

3

0

0.93

6

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

30

4

0

0.91

7

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

28

6

0

0.86

8

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

25

9

0

0.80

9

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

30

4

0

0.91

10

4

41

0

0

1.00

10

30

4

0

0.91

Computational Efficiency
It was expected that the computational complexity for this algorithm would be
O(2n). By using pandas DataFrame objects extensively, this algorithm did not directly
loop through each event. It did loop through each partition, which resulted in 100
iterations. The algorithm relied upon the built-in optimizations of the DataFrame class to
perform calculations for the entire dataset. As a result, it can be estimated that this
algorithm’s complexity may be expressed as less than O(n). In testing, algorithms for
calculating P(E) and P(A) completed in less than one minute. Thus, the use of the
algorithm for anomaly detection did not add any significant computational penalty
beyond the performance of multiple runs of the k-means clustering that were used in the
first experiment to generate the partitions.
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Observations
The results of this experiment demonstrated that unsupervised anomaly detection
at the event-level was not accurate for detecting attack classes. Instead, event-level
detection using this approach found a portion of the normal classes with highly accurate
results. Using this observation to calculate a belief that an event may be anomalous was
found to be highly effective in calculating the probability that a computer system was
under attack. By examining the srcip and dstip separately, the accuracy was consistently
100% for the srcip and ranged from 80% to 93% for the dstip. As a result, this
experiment demonstrated that the clustering ensemble probabilistic intrusion detection
system detected the computer systems that were under attack. It accomplished this
prediction without relying upon labeled data for training and without training during
attack-free time periods to detect abnormal events.

Experiment 3: Active Learning
Design
The third experiment incorporated active learning into the overall intrusion
detection system. When initially proposing this research, it was unclear how active
learning would be applied, since it depended on how the first two experiments were
implemented. Since active learning queries an oracle to label of a select number of
records, the primary design consideration was how large of a sample to submit to the
oracle. Options considered were to sample from the events to update P(E) or to sample
from the computer system level to update P(A).
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Figure 11 lists the pseudocode for this algorithm. This algorithm selects all srcip
and dstip computer systems that had P(A) ≥ 0.8. From this subset of all computer
systems, a pseudorandom sample of events for each of these computer systems was
selected. These sampled events were submitted to the oracle for labeling. If the oracle
returned a response that the event was an attack, then the P(A) for that srcip or dstip was
updated to 1.0, signifying that the computer system was experiencing an attack.

For each srcip with P(A) ≥ 0.8:
Collect events with srcip
Create sample of N records from
For each record in sample:
Ask oracle for labels
If number of attack labels
Update P(A) to 1
Else:
Update P(A) to 0
For each dstip with P(A) ≥ 0.8:
Collect events with dstip
Create sample of N records from
For each record in sample:
Ask oracle for labels
If number of attack labels
Update P(A) to 1
Else:
Update P(A) to 0

collected events
> 0:

collected events
> 0:

Figure 11. Pseudocode for active learning algorithm

Unlike McElwee (2017), in which a separate oracle class was constructed to
simulate the human analyst, this experiment relied upon the DataFrame that was used as
a data structure for holding both the original dataset and the results. Attack labels were
identified by querying the label column of the DataFrame. As a result, the queries always
resulted in accurate labels, even for rare events.

99

Analysis
Since the goal of this research was to reduce the workload of human analysts, the
purpose of this experiment was to find the minimum number of samples to submit to the
oracle for labeling that would still result in a high accuracy. To be representative of the
events assigned to each srcip and dstip, a sample size of √𝑁 was selected as the starting
point, where N was the number of events for each srcip or dstip. Initial experimentation
with this sample size concluded that active learning consistently identified computer
systems under attack with 100% accuracy. Next, this experiment proceeded to reduce the
number of samples and evaluate the accuracy, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10
Active Learning Accuracy
srcip
Sample Accuracy

√𝑁
3
√𝑁
4
√𝑁
5
√𝑁
10
√𝑁

dstip
Sample Accuracy

317

100.0%

499

100.0%

73

100.0%

134

100.0%

35

100.0%

70

100.0%

23

100.0%

47

97.7%

10

100.0%

22

95.4%

The results in Table 10 show that for srcip, the accuracy is 100% for all sample
sizes, but this is because the original accuracy of the anomaly detection in the second
experiment was already 100%. Thus, the dstip is a better indicator of sample sizes for
active learning. Each sample size improved the original accuracy of anomaly detection
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4

for the dstip. Sample sizes of √𝑁 and above achieved accuracies of 100%. To confirm
this sample size was the minimum for achieving this accuracy, this sample size was run
10 times and achieved the same results each time.
Figure 12 shows the accuracy of the active learning compared to the sample size.
4

For sample sizes smaller than √𝑁 , the accuracy shows a downward slope.

Figure 12. Accuracy of active learning compared to sample size

Computational Efficiency
The algorithm for active learning with a simulated oracle was highly efficient,
since it had access to P(E), P(A), and the original features, including the label. Thus, by
creating the random sample using the DataFrame, the algorithm could stop as soon as a
single attack was identified. For each run, the computation time for this algorithm was a
few seconds. It was estimated that, where N is the total number of that could be sent to
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4

the oracle for labeling, the complexity was 𝑂(2 √𝑁 ), since for each sampled record, the
algorithm completed the same loop for both the srcip and the dstip.

Observations
This experiment demonstrated that by sampling events for srcip and dstip with a
4

sample size of √𝑁 , the residual error from anomaly detection could be reduced to
achieve 100% accuracy. This approach relies on the anomaly detection algorithm
identifying all of the true positives, since this active learning approach focuses on
eliminating false positives, not on reducing false negatives. As a result, when the active
learning algorithm was applied to the UNSW-NB15 dataset with 700,001 events, a
human analyst would have been required to review a maximum of 105 events to identify
all of the computer systems involved in an attack with 100% accuracy.

Summary
This chapter described the design and implementation of the experiments
performed in this research. It showed the class diagram of the major components of the
system and reviewed the function of each. In addition, this chapter provided a more indepth description of the dataset characteristics and preprocessing needed to ensure that
the datasets were highly imbalanced.
This chapter also reviewed each experiment, including specific design
considerations, analysis, and observations. Since computational efficiency has been an
important consideration when implementing clustering ensemble evaluation, the
computational efficiency was discussed for each experiment. Each of the experiments
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contributed to the overall demonstration that clustering ensembles were effective for
anomaly-based intrusion detection. The first experiment identified a characteristic of
imbalanced datasets that allowed the isolation of a significant portion of normal events.
Using this characteristic of imbalanced data, the second experiment assigned a belief to
the events to reflect uncertainty. In addition, the second experiment estimated the
probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack by calculating the
probability as the average belief at the event level and by scaling the result to range from
zero to one. The second experiment found that for source IP addresses involved in
attacks, the algorithm was 100% accurate for probabilities ≥ 0.8. For destination IP
addresses involved in attacks, the algorithm was between 80% and 93% accurate for
probabilities ≥ 0.8. Finally, the third experiment used the results of the previous
experiment to incorporate active learning, which allowed a maximum of 105 events to be
labeled by the oracle, thus improving the accuracy to 100% for the destination IP address.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
This research set out to address the problem that there was no approach to
intrusion detection that reduced the workload of human analysts by providing a
probabilistic prediction that a computer was experiencing a cyberattack. The goal for
addressing this problem was to improve anomaly-based intrusion detection by adding
meaning to alerts by using probabilistic clustering ensembles. By adding meaning to
alerts, the desired outcome was to reduce the workload of security analysts.
Through the implementation of three experiments and the analysis of their results,
five primary conclusions emerge. The first conclusion was that, as proposed, clustering
ensembles provided multiple perspectives on the event data. These different perspectives
were important in this research, since each partition only identified a single cluster of
normal events. In some cases, the partition did not identify any normal events, but
together the partitions provided sufficient observations to determine which computer
systems were being attacked.
Second, for highly imbalanced datasets, which are characteristic for intrusion
detection, clustering ensembles were effective in identifying certain normal events with a
high degree of accuracy. This was likely because of the highly imbalanced nature of the
input dataset. By identifying clusters that contained more than two standard deviations
above the mean of events in each cluster, approximately 95% or more similar events from
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the partition were represented in the cluster. Although normal events were scattered
throughout the remaining clusters and mixed with attack events, the identification of a
large population of normal events enabled them to be eliminated from the belief that they
contained attacks.
The third conclusion of this research was that unsupervised intrusion detection did
not require an accurate probability that an event was an attack. Prediction of events in this
research resulted in a range of uncertainty, represented by a probability of 0.5, to a level
of accurate identification of some normal events. Using the event-level prediction as a
belief and aggregating that belief to the computer system level enabled prediction of
computer systems under attack with 80% to 93% accuracy.
The fourth conclusion of this research was that active learning enabled a
minimum level of interaction by human analysts while increasing accuracy to 100%. The
algorithms developed in this research detected the computer systems experiencing attacks
in a dataset with 700,001 events by requesting information from the oracle for 105
events. As a result, this form of anomaly detection combined with active learning may be
effective for reducing the workload of human analysts in practice.
The fifth conclusion of this research was that the use of clustering ensembles for
probabilistic intrusion detection, when combined with active learning, provided a highly
accurate method for identifying computer systems that were experiencing a cyberattack.
This method used unsupervised machine learning to identify the computer systems with
the highest probability of an attack. It then used a minimal number of interactions with
the oracle to accurately identify the affected systems.

105
Implications
This research contributed to intrusion detection in several ways. First, the
application of clustering ensembles to intrusion detection is a relatively new area of
study. This research provided a new approach for anomaly-based intrusion detection that
relied on the highly imbalanced nature of the data used to detect intrusions.
Next, this research found that combining uncertain event-level probabilities
allowed the estimation of the probability that a computer system was under attack with
reasonable accuracy. This was an important contribution to research, since it
demonstrated that event-level detection does not need to be highly accurate to provide a
higher level of meaning to alerts. This opens the possibility that combining alerts from
existing intrusion detection methods may also be effective when aggregated at the
computer system level.
This research also contributed to intrusion detection by contributing research that
supports the use of a new dataset for intrusion detection – the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Since its release in 2015, it has been used in a growing number of research studies. This
research further strengthens the support of a more contemporary dataset for intrusion
detection and helps to better position the UNSW-NB15 to replace the outdated KDD Cup
1999 dataset.
Lastly, this research contributed to existing research in active learning for
intrusion detection. At present, there does not appear to be research that applies active
learning to use events to detect the probability of a computer system level attack. This
contribution makes it possible to further reduce the workload of human analysts in
reviewing alerts.
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Recommendations
This research laid a foundation for additional intrusion detection research. Three
specific areas for future research should be considered. First, improvements in cluster
partition evaluation will help to better qualify which partitions should be included in the
anomaly detection. A better understanding of which partitions contribute to a good
solution may help to improve the accuracy of anomaly detection at the event level, which
will contribute to an improved calculation of the probability that a computer system is
experiencing an attack. Second, this research should be extended to combine events from
multiple security monitoring systems, such as host-based audit logs, signature-based
alerts, and network flow data. Observations of potential attacks from these systems can
be grouped using the computer system identifiers, such as IP addresses. As a result, this
may enable improved CSA because of additional perspectives. Third, the experiments in
this research combined observations at the event-level and grouped the results on the
source and destination IP addresses. This approach may also be useful for combining
event-level observations at the user-level, where user login names are provided within the
event data. Future research should apply probabilistic clustering ensembles to insider
threat detection to identify organization insiders who may pose a threat to the security of
systems and data.
In addition, this research presents an approach that may be used to improve
existing security monitoring practices in organizations. Security analysts generally
respond to event-level security alerts. In many cases, these alerts provide insufficient
information to determine the credibility, significance, and impact of the alert. Using the
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results of this research, it is possible to provide a broader picture of CSA by focusing
security analysts on the computer systems that are most likely being attacked. This
change in focus will allow security analysts to more quickly determine a course of action
without relying on their own observations to create a mental picture of what is occurring.
In addition, the algorithms used in this research can be adapted to include additional
datasets as well as to be verified in operational networks. Finally, this research should be
applied to off-line analysis of network data to support the newly emerging practice of
cyber threat hunting, in which security analysts examine various data sources to identify
computer systems that may have become compromised but did not trigger alerts from
regular monitoring systems (Sqrrl Data, 2018).
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Summary
Introduction
This research focused on the problem that there was no approach to intrusion
detection that reduced the workload of human analysts by providing a probabilistic
prediction that a computer is experiencing a cyberattack. Intrusion detection is the
practice of examining information from computers and networks so that cyberattacks can
be identified (Debar et al., 1999). Effective intrusion detection is important for
organizations, since earlier detection of cyberattacks helps to reduce the impact and
recovery costs (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Yet many intrusions are missed because of the
volume of alerts that analysts must review, resulting in fatigue and errors in judgement
(Julisch, 2003; Sawyer et al., 2014).
This research addressed several problems associated with intrusion detection.
First, it addressed the high false-positive rates that accompany highly imbalanced data
sets, where there are very few attacks scattered through large datasets of normal events.
To address this problem, this research used observations of sparse attack events to predict
the probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack. This was more
accurate than predicting attacks at the event level. In addition, this research applied active
learning, which allowed simulated human interaction to improve the overall accuracy.
Second, this research addressed problems of overfitting and evasion. These are important
problems, since machine learning algorithms that are overfitted are unable to find novel
attacks and are not resilient to evasive adversarial tactics (Sommer & Paxson, 2010).
Third, this research addressed the issue of using suitable datasets for evaluation of
intrusion detection systems. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been the standard dataset for
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evaluation since its inception, but it does not reflect current operating systems and does
not contain identifiers of the source or destination computer systems involved in each
event. This research addressed this problem by using the NSL-KDD dataset, to provide a
connection to past research, as well as the UNSW-NB15 dataset, to provide a more
contemporary view of network events.
This research was built upon a foundation of past research in intrusion detection.
It applied CSA to establish a basis for deriving higher levels of meaning from intrusion
alerts. It reviewed past machine learning approaches to intrusion detection research,
especially probabilistic methods, to uncover the challenges and gaps in current research.
It assessed the features and capabilities of clustering ensembles, with a focus on cluster
evaluation. Finally, this research reviewed available intrusion detection datasets that had
been developed and used in past research studies.

Methodology
To address the problems associated with intrusion detection, this research
implemented three experiments. The purpose of the experiments was to test the initial
assumptions that clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis and active learning may
be effective for intrusion detection. The experiments were conducted using a prototype
that was created using Python, pandas, and scikit-learn.
The first experiment evaluated cluster generation strategies and examined how to
create diverse clustering results that could be used in subsequent experiments. The cluster
generation approach used bagging to select a pseudorandom number and set of features
for each partition of clustering results. Clusters were generated using the k-means
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clustering algorithm. The generated clusters were evaluated to test the initial assumptions
about the characteristics of what represented normal and attack events.
The second experiment implemented and tested an algorithm that used the
partitions of clusters that were generated in the first experiment to predict the probability
that an event was an anomaly. Next, the algorithm used the event-level probabilities to
calculate the probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack. To test if
this algorithm was effective, this experiment evaluated the accuracy of both the eventlevel and the computer system-level probabilities.
The third experiment added active learning, which allowed the simulation of
human interaction, to fine tune the overall results. The active learning was implemented
by selecting a random sampling of the event-level probabilities for the computer systems
that had ≥ 0.8 probability of experiencing an attack. This experiment evaluated the
minimum number of samples that could be used to achieve improvements in accuracy.

Results
The first experiment found that using bagging and k-means clustering to generate
a range of partitions with 40 to 100 clusters in each partition provided diverse results.
This experiment found that the clustering results did not successfully identify anomalous
events, but instead had higher accuracy in predicting the most normal clusters. By
evaluating the mean number of events in each cluster of each partition, this experiment
found that clusters that contained a number of events greater than or equal to two
standard deviations above the mean number of events were consistently normal records.
None of the events below this threshold were identified exclusively as attack events.
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Using the results of the first experiment, the second experiment calculated the
probability of an event being an anomaly from a range of 0 to 0.5. Thus, the event-level
probability was more of a measure of uncertainty or belief. Next, it calculated the
probability that a computer system was under attack by finding the mean of the eventlevel probabilities for each source and destination computer system. This experiment
evaluated the event-level probabilities and determined that, above a midpoint threshold of
votes from each partition, the prediction of normal events was highly accurate. Next, this
experiment evaluated the accuracy of the probability that a computer system was
experiencing an attack. This test was conducted 10 times, using a new bagging plan for
each run. The accuracy of detection using the source IP address was 100% for all 10 runs.
The accuracy of detection using the destination IP address ranged from 80% to 93%.
The third experiment evaluated the effect of adding active learning by selecting
event-level samples for each of the computer systems that had probabilities of ≥ 0.8. The
10

4

sample sizes tested ranged from √𝑁 to √𝑁 . This experiment found that samples of √𝑁
consistently resulted in improved accuracy that a computer system was experiencing an
attack. As a result, for the 700,001 events in the UNSW-NB15 dataset, sampling a total
of 105 events resulted in 100% accuracy.
These results demonstrated that the use of clustering ensembles for probabilistic
intrusion detection, when combined with active learning, provided a highly accurate
method for identifying computer systems that were experiencing a cyberattack. The use
of clustering ensembles provided multiple perspectives on the event data and enabled the
prediction of attacks at the computer system-level by relying on the high-confidence
normal events, even though the event-level prediction of anomalies was inaccurate.
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Contributions and Future Work
This research contributed to the field of intrusion detection by applying clustering
ensembles to unsupervised anomaly detection. It is expected that this approach can be
generalized to apply to other types of anomaly detection that are characterized by highly
imbalanced datasets. Additional research should evaluate this in other applications,
especially insider threat detection and cyber threat hunting.
Another important contribution of this research is that it demonstrated that
combining uncertain event-level data to predict the probability that a computer system is
experiencing an attack is highly accurate. This approach provided more meaning than
individual events alone could provide and may be expanded in future research to combine
alerts from a variety of intrusion detection systems as well as other security event
monitoring systems. This will further reduce the workload of human analysts by creating
a higher level of situational awareness.
This research also contributed to intrusion detection by applying a relatively new
dataset, UNSW-NB15. As a result, this research strengthened support for a more
contemporary dataset for intrusion detection. Future research should evaluate the use of
probabilistic clustering ensembles with active learning to new datasets, as they are
developed. In addition, future research should apply this approach using operational
network data from an actual organization to validate that it can extend from research into
practice.
Finally, this research added to previous studies related to reducing the human
workload and resulting fatigue that are associated with security monitoring. It provided a
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practical approach to apply unsupervised machine learning to prioritize the computer
systems that are most suspicious, and it minimized the amount of human decision-making
required. As a result, it may allow security analysts to more quickly determine a course of
action when dealing with cyberattacks.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Source Code Availability and Usage

All the source code for the experiments in this research is available at the author’s
GitHub repository. It is available for researchers to enhance and extend this research in
intrusion detection systems. This appendix describes how to obtain the source code, the
package dependencies, configuration parameters, and execution instructions. Many of
these instructions are specific to the Ubuntu operating system and may need to be adapted
for other systems.

Source Code
The source code may be downloaded from GitHub at:
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids
From the command line, the source code may be cloned by:
git clone https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids.git

Package Dependencies
Python 2.7 and PIP
The software used in this research was designed to work with Python 2.7. PIP was
used to install additional packages. Python and PIP can be installed using:
sudo apt install python2.7 python-pip
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scikit-learn
scikit-learn is required for the KMeans class, which performs the clustering. It can
be installed using:
pip install scikit-learn

pandas
When installed as an operating system package, the pandas package satisfies
several additional dependencies, such as numpy. This can be installed using:
sudo apt install python-pandas

Configuration Parameters
The following parameters are configurable by updating variables at the beginning
of the cepids.py file:

dataset_file
The filename of the input dataset. This must be either the absolute path to the file
or relative to the directory from which the cepids.py package is executed. Example:
'datasets/derived/kdd_u2r_r2l.csv'.

dataset_class
The class name of the input dataset. This must be either UNSW or NSLKDD.
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num_partitions
The number of partitions that will be generated. This is used subsequently when
evaluating the partitions as well. The recommended setting is: 100.

min_feature_ratio
The minimum number of features that will be used in the bagging plan for
generating diverse clusters. The recommended setting is: 0.25.

max_feature_ratio
The maximum number of features that will be used in the bagging plan for
generating diverse clusters. The recommended setting is: 0.75.

min_clusters
The minimum number of clusters that will be created in each partition. The
recommended setting is: 40.

max_clusters
The maximum number of clusters that will be created in each partition. The
recommended setting is: 100.

input_partition_file
Optional. The source file for a previously generated set of partitions. If a CSV
was retained from Experiment 1, it can be used as the input for Experiment 2 to save time

118
and prevent recreation of partitions each time changes are made in the second
experiment. If left blank, Experiment 1 will generate new partitions. If provided, it must
contain either the absolute or relative path to the CSV partition file. Example:
'experiment1_partitions_unsw_100p_01.csv'.

num_stdev
This is the number of standard deviations above the mean number of clusters that
will be used as a threshold to determine the clusters that contain normal classes. The
recommended setting is: 2.

sample_size_exponent
4

The exponent for creating the sample size for active learning. For example: √𝑁 =
1

𝑁 4 . To set the exponent, this can be set as a decimal value, or for readability, as an
equation, such as: 1.0/4. Note that in Python, the decimal value of 1.0 is needed to
prevent Python from truncating this to an integer. The recommended value is: 1.0/4.

active_learning_output_file
The desired path to the results file to be created in Experiment 3. The output file
is a CSV file that contains the srcip, dstip, P_E, P_A_SRC, P_A_DST, and label for each
event in the original dataset. Example: 'results/final_output.csv'.
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Appendix B
Dataset Descriptions

NSL-KDD
The derived version of the NSL-KDD dataset retains the characteristics of the
NSL-KDD dataset, but removes the denial of service events. It includes only user-to-root
attacks, remote-to-local attacks, and normal records is available at:
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids/raw/master/datasets/derived/kdd_u2r_r2
l.zip

The data was created using a Python script that is available at:
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids/blob/master/create_traces.py

The NSL-KDD dataset is composed of 41 attributes, a label, and a cluster ID that
was created specifically for the NSL-KDD dataset. The table below shows the specific
field names that are included as well as the datatypes.
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Table 11
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes
Attribute
duration

Datatype
continuous

protocol_type
service

symbolic
symbolic

flag
src_bytes

symbolic
continuous

dst_bytes

continuous

land

continuous

wrong_fragment
urgent
hot
num_failed_logins
logged_in
num_compromised
root_shell
su_attempted

continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous

num_root
num_file_creations
num_shells
num_access_files

continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous

num_outbound_cmds

continuous

is_host_login

continuous

is_guest_login

continuous

count

continuous

srv_count

continuous

serror_rate

continuous

Description
length (number of seconds) of the
connection
type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc.
network service on the destination, e.g.,
http, telnet, etc.
normal or error status of the connection
number of data bytes from source to
destination
number of data bytes from destination to
source
1 if connection is from/to the same
host/port; 0 otherwise
number of ``wrong'' fragments
number of urgent packets
number of “hot”' indicators
number of failed login attempts
1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise
number of “compromised” conditions
1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise
1 if “su root” command attempted; 0
otherwise
number of “root” accesses
number of file creation operations
number of shell prompts
number of operations on access control
files
number of outbound commands in an ftp
session
1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0
otherwise
1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0
otherwise
number of connections to the same host as
the current connection in the past two
seconds
number of connections to the same service
as the current connection in the past two
seconds
% of connections that have “SYN” errors
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Table 11
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes (cont.)
Attribute
srv_serror_rate

Datatype
continuous

rerror_rate
srv_rerror_rate

continuous
continuous

same_srv_rate
diff_srv_rate
srv_diff_host_rate
dst_host_count

continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous

dst_host_srv_count

continuous

dst_host_same_srv_rate

continuous

dst_host_diff_srv_rate

continuous

dst_host_same_src_port_rate continuous

dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate

continuous

dst_host_serror_rate

continuous

dst_host_srv_serror_rate

continuous

dst_host_rerror_rate

continuous

Description
% of connections that have “SYN”
errors for same service connections
% of connections that have “REJ” errors
% of connections that have ``REJ'' errors
for same service connections
% of connections to the same service
% of connections to different services
% of connections to different hosts
Number of connections having the same
destination host IP address
Number of connections having the same
port number
The percentage of connections that were
to the same service, among the
connections aggregated in
dst_host_count
The percentage of connections that were
to different services, among the
connections aggregated in
dst_host_count
The percentage of connections that were
to the same source port, among the
connections aggregated in
dst_host_srv_c ount
The percentage of connections that were
to different destination machines, among
the connections aggregated in
dst_host_srv_c
The percentage of connections that have
activated the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3,
among the connections aggregated in
dst_host_count
The percent of connections that have
activated the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3,
among the connections aggregated in
dst_host_srv_c ount
The percentage of connections that have
activated the flag (4) REJ, among the
connections aggregated in
dst_host_count
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Table 11
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes (cont.)
Attribute
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate

label
cluster_id

Datatype Description
continuous The percentage of connections that have
activated the flag (4) REJ, among the
connections aggregated in
dst_host_srv_c ount
symbolic
Class of each event
symbolic
Integer cluster id that is representative of
the class

UNSW-NB15
For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the file UNSW-NB15_1.csv was used for the
experiments in this research. Table 12 shows the features, datatypes, and descriptions of
this dataset. It is available from the original researchers at:
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-cyber/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15Datasets/UNSW-NB15_1.csv

Table 12
UNSW-NB15 Attributes and Datatypes
Name
srcip
sport
dstip
dsport
proto
state

Datatype
nominal
integer
nominal
integer
nominal
nominal

dur
sbytes
dbytes

Float
Integer
Integer

Description
Source IP address
Source port number
Destination IP address
Destination port number
Transaction protocol
Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol, e.g.
ACC, CLO, CON, ECO, ECR, FIN, INT, MAS, PAR,
REQ, RST, TST, TXD, URH, URN, and (-) (if not used
state)
Record total duration
Source to destination transaction bytes
Destination to source transaction bytes
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Table 12
UNSW-NB15 Dataset (cont.)
Name
sttl
dttl
sloss
dloss
service

Datatype
Integer
Integer
Integer
Integer
nominal

Description
Source to destination time to live value
Destination to source time to live value
Source packets retransmitted or dropped
Destination packets retransmitted or dropped
http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, ftp-data ,irc and (-) if not
much used service
sload
Float
Source bits per second
dload
Float
Destination bits per second
spkts
integer
Source to destination packet count
dpkts
integer
Destination to source packet count
swin
integer
Source TCP window advertisement value
dwin
integer
Destination TCP window advertisement value
stcpb
integer
Source TCP base sequence number
dtcpb
integer
Destination TCP base sequence number
smeansz
integer
Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the src
dmeansz
integer
Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the dst
trans_depth
integer
Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of
http request/response transaction
res_bdy_len
integer
Actual uncompressed content size of the data
transferred from the server’s http service.
sjit
Float
Source jitter (mSec)
djit
Float
Destination jitter (mSec)
stime
Timestamp record start time
ltime
Timestamp record last time
sintpkt
Float
Source interpacket arrival time (mSec)
dintpkt
Float
Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec)
tcprtt
Float
TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of
’synack’ and ’ackdat’.
synack
Float
TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN
and the SYN_ACK packets.
ackdat
Float
TCP connection setup time, the time between the
SYN_ACK and the ACK packets.
is_sm_ips_ports
Binary
If source (1) and destination (3)IP addresses equal and
port numbers (2)(4) equal then, this variable takes
value 1 else 0
ct_state_ttl
Integer
No. for each state (6) according to specific range of
values for source/destination time to live (10) (11).
ct_flw_http_mthd Integer
No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in
http service.
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Table 12
UNSW-NB15 Dataset (cont.)
Name
is_ftp_login

Datatype
Binary

ct_ftp_cmd
ct_srv_src

integer
integer

ct_srv_dst

integer

ct_dst_ltm

integer

ct_src_ ltm

integer

ct_src_dport_ltm

integer

ct_dst_sport_ltm

integer

ct_dst_src_ltm

integer

attack_cat

nominal

Label

binary

Description
If the ftp session is accessed by user and password then
1 else 0.
No of flows that has a command in ftp session.
No. of connections that contain the same service (14)
and source address (1) in 100 connections according to
the last time (26).
No. of connections that contain the same service (14)
and destination address (3) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).
No. of connections of the same destination address (3)
in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
No. of connections of the same source address (1) in
100 connections according to the last time (26).
No of connections of the same source address (1) and
the destination port (4) in 100 connections according to
the last time (26).
No of connections of the same destination address (3)
and the source port (2) in 100 connections according to
the last time (26).
No of connections of the same source (1) and the
destination (3) address in in 100 connections according
to the last time (26).
The name of each attack category. In this data set ,
nine categories e.g. Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS
Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and
Worms
0 for normal and 1 for attack records
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Appendix C
Python Package Versions

This research used Python 2.7 as well as packages at specific versions. Although
the cepids package may function with newer versions of these packages, it was only
tested with the versions shown in Table 13 below:

Table 13
Python Package Versions
Package

Version

dateutils

0.6.6

numpy

1.13.3

pandas

0.21.0

pip

9.0.1

python-dateutil

2.6.1

scikit-learn

0.19.1

scipy

1.0.0

setuptools

28.8.0
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Appendix D
Detailed Anomaly Detection Results
This appendix provides the detailed results of Experiment 2 for each of the 10
experimental runs of the completed algorithm. Each run lists both the srcip and the dstip
and their associated probabilities of experiencing an attack, P(A). IP addresses with P(A)
≥ 0.8 are considered positive results. A results column indicates if the results are true
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), or false positives (FP). There were no False negatives
found in these experiments.
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Table 14
Experiment 2, Run 1 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.2
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.18
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.16
10.40.182.3
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
192.168.241.243

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.918
0.876
0.824
0.659
0.652
0.649
0.630
0.624
0.622
0.622
0.621
0.620
0.615
0.543
0.538
0.527
0.520
0.513
0.513
0.511
0.508
0.507
0.495
0.296
0.213
0.175
0.172
0.169
0.113
0.103
0.101
0.082
0.082
0.074
0.070

dstip
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.12
224.0.0.5
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.15
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
10.40.182.3
32.50.32.66
175.45.176.1
10.40.85.30
192.168.241.243
175.45.176.2
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.1
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.1

Result
FP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.980
0.962
0.956
0.918
0.912
0.907
0.904
0.898
0.896
0.894
0.870
0.869
0.842
0.841
0.827
0.772
0.738
0.677
0.671
0.645
0.643
0.642
0.640
0.638
0.633
0.632
0.626
0.622
0.547
0.527
0.522
0.508
0.492
0.492
0.480
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Table 14
Experiment 2, Run 1 Results (cont.)
srcip
149.171.126.13
10.40.85.30
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.069
0.056
0.043
0.039

dstip
149.171.126.4
175.45.176.3
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.5
175.45.176.0
127.0.0.1
10.40.198.10

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.475
0.465
0.461
0.455
0.448
0.435
0.372
0.000
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Table 15
Experiment 2, Run 2 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.3
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
10.40.85.1
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.19
10.40.182.3
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
192.168.241.243

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.915
0.891
0.807
0.771
0.770
0.769
0.761
0.756
0.752
0.752
0.748
0.747
0.741
0.473
0.470
0.460
0.459
0.451
0.448
0.441
0.438
0.419
0.418
0.267
0.174
0.164
0.162
0.124
0.099
0.078
0.067
0.046
0.046
0.039
0.026

dstip
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
224.0.0.1
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.13
32.50.32.66
149.171.126.19
10.40.85.30
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.14
59.166.0.9
224.0.0.5
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.5
192.168.241.243
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.1
10.40.85.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.3

Result
FP
TP
FP
FP
TP
TP
FP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.992
0.965
0.953
0.948
0.920
0.910
0.908
0.893
0.875
0.872
0.869
0.868
0.864
0.844
0.815
0.813
0.789
0.780
0.778
0.771
0.768
0.766
0.759
0.758
0.747
0.619
0.572
0.538
0.520
0.466
0.361
0.292
0.288
0.277
0.261
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Table 15
Experiment 2, Run 2 Results (cont.)
srcip
149.171.126.13
10.40.85.30
149.171.126.17
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.021
0.020
0.010
0.000

dstip
10.40.198.10
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.7

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.234
0.193
0.187
0.180
0.150
0.138
0.123
0.000
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Table 16
Experiment 2, Run 3 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.7
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.0
10.40.85.1
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
10.40.170.2
10.40.182.3
10.40.85.30

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.919
0.878
0.838
0.761
0.753
0.745
0.727
0.724
0.724
0.723
0.723
0.720
0.716
0.515
0.494
0.489
0.488
0.484
0.472
0.470
0.467
0.442
0.430
0.279
0.180
0.180
0.177
0.168
0.118
0.105
0.092
0.088
0.083
0.083
0.075

dstip
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.14
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.10
224.0.0.1
10.40.182.3
32.50.32.66
10.40.85.30
10.40.85.1
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.1
175.45.176.2
224.0.0.5
175.45.176.1
192.168.241.243
175.45.176.3
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.3
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.6

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
1.000
0.997
0.994
0.981
0.981
0.981
0.972
0.971
0.967
0.956
0.945
0.943
0.898
0.893
0.814
0.813
0.804
0.799
0.798
0.797
0.792
0.782
0.770
0.767
0.759
0.660
0.653
0.493
0.441
0.430
0.365
0.355
0.349
0.323
0.320
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Table 16
Experiment 2, Run 3 Results (cont.)
srcip
149.171.126.12
192.168.241.243
149.171.126.17
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.066
0.055
0.048
0.048

dstip
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.5
10.40.198.10
175.45.176.0

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.319
0.310
0.293
0.282
0.261
0.225
0.076
0.000
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Table 17
Experiment 2, Run 4 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.2
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.16
10.40.170.2
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.12

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.920
0.907
0.842
0.622
0.621
0.619
0.609
0.608
0.608
0.604
0.601
0.600
0.597
0.465
0.462
0.459
0.459
0.440
0.420
0.412
0.409
0.389
0.376
0.231
0.174
0.169
0.160
0.158
0.110
0.090
0.086
0.078
0.078
0.066
0.061

dstip
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.17
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.18
10.40.170.2
32.50.32.66
10.40.182.3
10.40.85.30
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.2
224.0.0.5
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.5
175.45.176.1
10.40.85.1
175.45.176.2
192.168.241.243
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.5
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.6

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.997
0.996
0.993
0.992
0.988
0.987
0.977
0.963
0.920
0.903
0.887
0.861
0.784
0.656
0.616
0.607
0.599
0.597
0.596
0.591
0.589
0.587
0.583
0.582
0.564
0.525
0.513
0.509
0.449
0.343
0.339
0.312
0.305
0.301
0.294
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Table 17
Experiment 2, Run 4 Results (cont.)
srcip
10.40.85.30
192.168.241.243
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.056
0.053
0.026
0.022

dstip
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.9
175.45.176.3
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.4
10.40.198.10
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.293
0.273
0.262
0.231
0.228
0.225
0.137
0.000
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Table 18
Experiment 2, Run 5 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.0
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.15
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
10.40.170.2
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.12

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.939
0.920
0.858
0.726
0.713
0.706
0.695
0.693
0.691
0.688
0.687
0.684
0.683
0.520
0.513
0.513
0.499
0.495
0.486
0.483
0.474
0.471
0.391
0.205
0.173
0.168
0.164
0.139
0.111
0.090
0.087
0.075
0.075
0.070
0.057

dstip
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.18
224.0.0.1
32.50.32.66
10.40.170.2
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.1
10.40.182.3
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
10.40.85.30
175.45.176.2
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.0
175.45.176.3
224.0.0.5
192.168.241.243

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.998
0.987
0.986
0.978
0.972
0.963
0.945
0.901
0.876
0.866
0.814
0.807
0.745
0.717
0.717
0.716
0.715
0.715
0.706
0.693
0.686
0.683
0.683
0.534
0.524
0.445
0.414
0.412
0.397
0.395
0.373
0.362
0.362
0.360
0.341
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Table 18
Experiment 2, Run 5 Results (cont.)
srcip
10.40.85.30
192.168.241.243
149.171.126.17
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.054
0.048
0.038
0.027

dstip
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.3
175.45.176.1
149.171.126.5
175.45.176.0
10.40.198.10
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.327
0.323
0.320
0.300
0.236
0.132
0.060
0.000
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Table 19
Experiment 2, Run 6 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
10.40.85.1
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.19
10.40.170.2
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.13
192.168.241.243

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.926
0.906
0.836
0.737
0.722
0.721
0.718
0.716
0.713
0.710
0.708
0.706
0.700
0.541
0.525
0.519
0.515
0.506
0.499
0.498
0.498
0.483
0.468
0.268
0.188
0.185
0.185
0.163
0.115
0.113
0.096
0.083
0.083
0.076
0.072

dstip
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.13
32.50.32.66
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.18
10.40.182.3
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.8
224.0.0.5
59.166.0.3
192.168.241.243
59.166.0.4
10.40.85.30
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.7
10.40.85.1
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.0

Result
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.978
0.975
0.975
0.974
0.966
0.965
0.959
0.952
0.943
0.936
0.894
0.876
0.819
0.713
0.696
0.690
0.678
0.675
0.671
0.671
0.670
0.659
0.656
0.646
0.645
0.629
0.570
0.484
0.423
0.304
0.294
0.252
0.221
0.205
0.201
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Table 19
Experiment 2, Run 6 Results (cont.)
srcip
10.40.85.30
149.171.126.12
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.067
0.066
0.056
0.052

dstip
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.1
10.40.198.10
175.45.176.0

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.156
0.153
0.147
0.143
0.137
0.087
0.057
0.000
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Table 20
Experiment 2, Run 7 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.3
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.10
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.19
10.40.182.3
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
10.40.85.30

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.925
0.866
0.824
0.669
0.668
0.665
0.662
0.656
0.652
0.652
0.646
0.646
0.632
0.524
0.507
0.507
0.502
0.481
0.477
0.470
0.464
0.460
0.422
0.264
0.187
0.178
0.171
0.148
0.102
0.092
0.086
0.086
0.086
0.076
0.076

dstip
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.18
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.11
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.15
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
224.0.0.5
10.40.85.1
10.40.85.30
32.50.32.66
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
192.168.241.243
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.1
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.5

Result
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.975
0.964
0.956
0.949
0.945
0.937
0.934
0.926
0.897
0.889
0.885
0.865
0.824
0.822
0.812
0.750
0.706
0.690
0.682
0.678
0.672
0.668
0.660
0.660
0.652
0.635
0.617
0.598
0.557
0.499
0.459
0.453
0.445
0.429
0.410
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Table 20
Experiment 2, Run 7 Results (cont.)
srcip
192.168.241.243
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.17
127.0.0.1

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.062
0.058
0.036
0.031

dstip
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.0
175.45.176.3
149.171.126.1
175.45.176.0
127.0.0.1
10.40.198.10

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.400
0.399
0.390
0.387
0.332
0.257
0.169
0.000
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Table 21
Experiment 2, Run 8 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.7
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.3
149.171.126.18
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.15
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.19
10.40.182.3
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.12

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.913
0.877
0.833
0.761
0.736
0.730
0.714
0.711
0.711
0.710
0.706
0.706
0.702
0.578
0.573
0.557
0.548
0.540
0.537
0.531
0.528
0.527
0.514
0.190
0.186
0.181
0.146
0.108
0.102
0.095
0.089
0.089
0.081
0.081
0.059

dstip
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.15
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.18
32.50.32.66
10.40.182.3
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.1
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.8
175.45.176.1
10.40.85.30
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.3
175.45.176.2
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.4

Result
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.963
0.941
0.938
0.937
0.933
0.932
0.931
0.929
0.901
0.898
0.893
0.883
0.835
0.827
0.810
0.804
0.804
0.803
0.799
0.788
0.786
0.784
0.776
0.645
0.644
0.634
0.630
0.621
0.612
0.610
0.608
0.593
0.580
0.575
0.572
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Table 21
Experiment 2, Run 8 Results (cont.)
srcip
192.168.241.243
10.40.85.30
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.043
0.041
0.041
0.023

dstip
149.171.126.0
224.0.0.5
192.168.241.243
10.40.85.1
175.45.176.3
127.0.0.1
175.45.176.0
10.40.198.10

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.553
0.550
0.471
0.447
0.446
0.446
0.443
0.000
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Table 22
Experiment 2, Run 9 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.1
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.5
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.18
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.13
10.40.182.3
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.929
0.908
0.847
0.659
0.650
0.649
0.644
0.644
0.642
0.638
0.636
0.631
0.631
0.433
0.421
0.409
0.386
0.386
0.385
0.379
0.371
0.361
0.320
0.262
0.189
0.186
0.174
0.171
0.125
0.117
0.109
0.086
0.081
0.081
0.072

dstip
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.19
32.50.32.66
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.12
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.10
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.18
10.40.85.30
175.45.176.2
192.168.241.243
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.5
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
224.0.0.5
10.40.85.1
127.0.0.1
10.40.198.10
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.0

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
FP
TP
FP
TP
FP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.998
0.997
0.996
0.985
0.981
0.980
0.962
0.929
0.927
0.912
0.907
0.824
0.819
0.707
0.656
0.600
0.598
0.595
0.594
0.588
0.583
0.576
0.572
0.571
0.555
0.551
0.495
0.485
0.467
0.378
0.197
0.182
0.135
0.106
0.088
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Table 22
Experiment 2, Run 9 Results (cont.)
srcip
192.168.241.243
10.40.85.30
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.065
0.054
0.045
0.041

dstip
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.5
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.6

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.083
0.074
0.074
0.069
0.048
0.021
0.021
0.000
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Table 23
Experiment 2, Run 10 Results
srcip
175.45.176.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.2
175.45.176.0
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.4
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.7
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.1
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.4
59.166.0.7
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.0
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.18
149.171.126.15
10.40.182.1
149.171.126.10
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.11
10.40.170.2
10.40.182.3
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.12

Result
TP
TP
TP
TP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.914
0.887
0.839
0.703
0.695
0.694
0.688
0.687
0.684
0.684
0.682
0.681
0.671
0.593
0.582
0.581
0.577
0.569
0.568
0.566
0.559
0.556
0.498
0.282
0.195
0.183
0.178
0.162
0.107
0.104
0.096
0.085
0.085
0.077
0.071

dstip
10.40.170.2
149.171.126.12
149.171.126.14
149.171.126.13
149.171.126.15
149.171.126.17
149.171.126.19
149.171.126.11
149.171.126.18
224.0.0.1
149.171.126.16
149.171.126.10
10.40.182.3
32.50.32.66
10.40.85.30
59.166.0.9
59.166.0.6
59.166.0.2
59.166.0.3
59.166.0.8
59.166.0.0
59.166.0.4
175.45.176.0
175.45.176.2
59.166.0.1
59.166.0.5
59.166.0.7
224.0.0.5
10.40.85.1
149.171.126.0
149.171.126.2
149.171.126.5
149.171.126.3
149.171.126.9
149.171.126.1
149.171.126.4

Result
FP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
TP
FP
TP
TP
FP
FP
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
1.000
0.983
0.969
0.962
0.961
0.960
0.958
0.955
0.951
0.933
0.930
0.930
0.863
0.857
0.696
0.638
0.633
0.633
0.631
0.624
0.620
0.620
0.617
0.614
0.612
0.599
0.593
0.522
0.514
0.389
0.387
0.367
0.366
0.352
0.344
0.329
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Table 23
Experiment 2, Run 10 Results (cont.)
srcip
10.40.85.30
127.0.0.1
149.171.126.17
192.168.241.243

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.064
0.051
0.051
0.051

dstip
149.171.126.6
149.171.126.8
149.171.126.7
192.168.241.243
127.0.0.1
175.45.176.3
175.45.176.1
10.40.198.10

Result
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

P(A)
0.303
0.300
0.299
0.226
0.226
0.207
0.127
0.000
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